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Large-scale failure resulting from natural disasters or intentional attacks is now 
considered a serious risk for communication network infrastructure. In these events, 
simultaneous damages in several links and nodes may cause substantial loss of 
information, which can be very costly for governments, subscribers and businesses. The 
impact of natural disasters generally is probabilistic in nature. Geographical 
characteristics and the distance of the components to the centre of the disaster may 
change the failure probability. Considering the probabilistic failure feature in natural 
disasters and the possible vast area coverage, we aim to develop a probabilistic dynamic 
model to protect data from failure and maintain undisrupted network services in large-
scale failure scenarios.  For this purpose, we develop a preventive protection model, 
which is able to estimate the potential destruction of all the network components in 
different locations. Using this information, the proposed model has a holistic view of the 
failure probabilities for the different paths to make a decision to reroute traffic from the 
endangered routes through the more reliable paths prior to the failure. As the proposed 
model protects data before failure, the size of damaged traffic will decrease and fewer 
connections need to be restored. The proposed preventive model is able to adjust 
rerouting decision parameters in a dynamic way by considering the disaster expansion 
and available network resources at each decision interval. Our findings show that the 
proposed preventive protection model significantly reduces the average number of 
disrupted connections and successfully decreases the required network restoration time. 
The performance of the proposed model has been examined in software defined 
networking (SDN), which is one of the emerging technologies in communication 
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networks. We studied the performance of a SDN controller instructed with a considerable 
amount of data flow updates and the best method of applying preventive rerouting is 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Over the last few years, the exponential growth of network services has provided 
connectivity for hundreds of millions of systems, devices and users. The original purpose 
of the Internet for remote system access has expanded with emerging important 
applications such as social networking, e-commerce, voice over IP and many more, 
making it part of our daily lives. Many of those applications such as online banking and 
online trading are time-sensitive and critical to businesses and governments. The 
widespread and growing online demand reveals the importance of having a fast 
communication network to provide high quality data transport at minimum time. To 
achieve this target, data transfer in the Internet backbone is mainly relying on fiber optic 
technology because of features that make it an ideal platform for this purpose. The current 
optical technology allows transferring a massive amount of data (up to 100 Gbps) in each 
lightpath [1]. Besides the widespread fiber optic connections on land, the world‟s 
continents are connected together using submarine communication cables to transfer huge 
amounts of data all over the world (Figure1). The combination of all these mediums 
together forms the backbone of Internet infrastructure in large-scale geographical areas.  
 
Figure1. Long-haul submarine cable maps.  
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Several factors such as accidental cable cuts, natural disasters or explosions can cause 
damage to physical links. Such damage may affect lightpaths carried by the link and 
result in substantial losses of information that can be catastrophic, affecting banking, 
business operations, health care, air lines and more. As a result, industry and the public 
who rely on the Internet infrastructure require a high degree of reliability in the backbone 
network. A resilient network should be able to provide and maintain an accepted level of 
service and operation continuity in face of failures.  
1.1 Background and Motivation  
Network failure recovery has been the subject of many research efforts in the past 
three decades and several models have been proposed to address this issue.  Most studies 
regarding network resiliency in the past focused primarily on network restoration in cases 
of single or double failures. However with ever-increasing reliance on network-based 
services in today‟s society, the issue of network resilience in large-scale failure scenarios 
has started to gain a great deal of attention. Natural disasters such as earthquakes or 
power outages may cover a vast area and the impact of such disasters on the physical 
communication infrastructure would cause large-scale network service failures. In this 
event, simultaneous damages to several links and nodes may cause substantial loss of 
data, which can be very costly for governments, subscribers and businesses. For example, 
the Taiwan earthquake in December 2006 [2]  resulted in several simultaneous undersea 
cable cuts, causing a major communication disruption in parts of Asia for several weeks. 
Another research project studied network service disruption and its consequent effects 
after Hurricane Katrina – one of the most destructive Atlantic hurricanes ever [3]. This 
study measured the impact of Hurricane Katrina by analyzing network services disruption 
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caused by the disaster. For this reason, survivability of critical infrastructure systems and 
continued, undisrupted network operations in the presence of large-scale failures has 
become a major concern for communication network operators. 
Although IP routing protocols are able to compute alternative paths and reroute traffic 
in failure scenarios, they are too slow for carrier-grade restoration. To reduce required 
network restoration time and reroute traffic as fast as possible, recovery approaches 
should be applied to the network backbone, where routing mostly relies on methods such 
as Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) or Wavelength-Division Multiplexing (WDM) 
lightpaths. In this research we assumed, without loss of generality, an MPLS-based 
network, however this model is applicable to many other connection-based or flow-based 
routing protocols such as software defined network SDN, which we discuss in further 
detail later in this thesis 
While there have been a number of studies on large-scale failures in communication 
networks, most of these works have taken a static view of failures. A common assumption 
among previous studies is that the failures are independent and consecutive failures will 
not happen at the same time [4-7]. However, the above assumption is not valid in large-
scale failure scenarios. For instance in natural disasters such as earthquakes or large-scale 
power outages, failure may cover a vast geographic area. These types of failures are 
geographically correlated, where the failure event usually starts from an epicentre and 
expands during a limited time across the region. Figure 2 shows an example of regional, 
dynamically expanding large-scale failures. The failure risk of a network component in 
these events depends on the distance of the component to the epicentre and also the 
intensity of the disaster. In this situation, simultaneous failures in network components 





Figure 2. Large-scale regional failure. 
Geographical characteristics and the distance of the components to the centre of the 
disaster may change the failure probability. This means that the failure risk for different 
components may not be equal and therefore the failure model should take into account the 
likelihood of component failure. Considering the probabilistic nature of failures and the 
wide area vulnerable to disasters in large-scale failure scenarios, we need a restoration 
framework that provides guidelines to network operators and supplies appropriate 
solutions to reduce the damaging effects of disasters.  
The lack of reported results in large-scale failure scenarios motivated us to examine 
network survivability issues in backbone networks with a dynamic probabilistic model 
that not only considers the time-varying dynamics of regional disasters (for example the 
expanding impact zone of earthquake as it spreads), but also takes into account the 
probabilistic nature of failures resulting from such events. To develop such an approach, 
the first step is to answer an essential question as to how to fortify the network to 
withstand failures caused by disasters. To answer this question, we will provide the 
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detailed problem statements and the targeted objectives in the next sections.   
1.2 Problem Statement 
Damaged critical infrastructures in the regions affected by natural disasters or nuclear 
explosions require fast recovery action to restore the disrupted services. Since the failures 
caused by disasters do not follow a deterministic pattern, the damage may be different 
from one to another. This characteristic reveals a need for dynamic methods to protect 
network services and prevention of data destruction corresponding to the severity of 
disasters. In any proposed solution, it should be considered that network components in 
the impact range would not all necessarily become nonfunctional, and that failures may 
happen with different probabilities.  In this situation, the problem is to develop a dynamic 
network protection model based on a set of initial information such as regional 
geographical data and disaster intensity, which should be able to evaluate the risk of 
disruption continuously and dynamically and take appropriate actions  
To address this issue, the proposed model should be able to use information derived 
from the network to calculate the probability of failure for each network components and 
reach a pattern that can be used to determine the degree of vulnerability to the ongoing 
disaster in each network region. This kind of model should not rely merely on static 
information such as earthquake prone zones, but should take into account dynamic 
information such as disaster impact epicentre location and its velocity of expansion as the 
disaster is unfolding. We believe the typical disaster expansion times – from between 20-
80 seconds for earthquakes [8] to longer times for hurricanes and other natural disasters – 
would give sufficient time to at least salvage some endangered network connections 
before they are disrupted. Eventually, a clear decision can be employed to reroute traffic 
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of the endangered locations through more reliable paths with less failure probability and 
protect them against upcoming failures. Thus the number of network components 
involved with transferring data that are going to be destroyed by the disaster will be 
reduced and the size of the affected traffic will be minimized. 
An appropriate decision making approach to detect endangered or safe areas in the 
network topology should consider network infrastructure availability at the time of study. 
Based on available resources on the network, decision parameters should be able to adjust 
themselves to provide adequate levels of protection without extra burdens on network 
performance. Along with disaster expansion and changes in the network topology, the 
above parameters should be adaptable in tune of network requirements.  By decreasing 
the size of affected traffic, fewer flows will be damaged that would need recovery. Fewer 
flow failures means less restoration time and decreasing network disruption time, which 
is one of the most important objectives in designing a resilient network. 
Furthermore, the emerging SDN technology shows a clear lack of an effective 
protection method in large-scale failure scenarios. Our approach is particularly suitable 
for SDN networks as there are included features such as central network controller and 
OpenFlow protocol, which can facilitate implementation of proactive flow rerouting as a 
result of data flow risk analysis. Implementing the proposed approach as a specific 
software (application) for disaster events to instruct the controller to apply protection 
policies and proactive rerouting patterns may improve network resiliency in large-scale 




 Given the described shortcomings of current protection approaches, the selected 
method should be able to protect network flows in large-scale failure scenarios. The 
proposed method in this research is capable of calculating failure probability for network 
components in a disaster zone. Based on this ability, the proper action to protect high risk 
flows will be taken. Our proposed algorithm can be implemented in a manner that 
coincides with widespread destruction and damage to the network as well as likelihood of 
future damages and adapts itself to improve network resiliency in large-scale failure 
scenarios. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms, the selected methods 
are simulated on real-world topologies using MATLAB software. The focus of this 
research is to reduce the number of disrupted connections and decrease the required 
restoration time rather than evaluating network efficiency in a packet level view. 
MATLAB is fully capable of studying the aforementioned metrics with high precision 
and is therefore a suitable tool to simulate our proposed methods. In simulation models, 
network performance is evaluated at discrete time intervals and at each inspection time, 
the deviation of metrics such as the number of disrupted connections and the required 
restoration time are investigated. To evaluate such metrics, topological properties at each 
inspection interval time are taken into account to update involved parameters in the 







1.4 Research Objectives 
The main goal of designing a survivable model in large-scale failure scenarios is to 
maintain the network service undisrupted. To achieve this goal we are looking to meet 
these objectives: 
 Design and develop a probabilistic preventive protection technique to protect 
information by rerouting traffic from endangered locations prior to the failure in 
large-scale failure scenarios.  
 Develop a probabilistic failure model to calculate the failure probability, 
considering wave-like behaviour as a common attribute among disasters.  
 Conduct sensitivity analysis with regard to risk decision parameters assignment in 
a preventive model and examine network behaviour under different values. 
 Design and develop a self-adaptive mechanism to adjust risk parameters 
dynamically in tune with network requirements and resources availability and 
validate the proposed model by simulating real-world networks. 
 Study network performance such as restoration time and disruptive connections in 
deterministic and probabilistic large-scale failure scenarios and provide a 
comparison to show how the selected failure model can affect network 
performance. Design a preventive protection model for SDN architecture to 
enhance network protection in large-scale failure scenarios and study the proposed 







1.5 Research Contributions 
Our contributions in this thesis are as follows: 
 A comprehensive study of network protection in large-scale failure scenarios is 
provided. Protection approach considering deterministic and probabilistic failures in 
different disaster scenarios have been studied and network performance for each 
protection approach is evaluated. 
 A wave-like model to estimate failure probability for network components in 
disaster scenarios is developed. The proposed model is able to determine risk failure 
probability for links and nodes in the network that encounter a disaster.  
 A proactive approach to prevent damage of endangered traffic in a disaster zone is 
elaborated. Considering this approach as a main contribution in this thesis, the 
proposed preventive protection model is able to protect high risk flows using a 
dynamic proactive mechanism to reroute traffic through safe areas prior to failure. 
 Risk decision parameters associated in preventive protection model are examined 
and an analysis for different risk decision parameter assignments is provided.  
 An automated approach to assign risk parameters for a preventive model is 
developed. In this way, the proposed protection model is able to adjust rerouting 
risk parameters based on the required level of protection and the potential risk 
failure in each interval inspection.   
 A proactive protection model in large-scale failure scenarios for an SDN network is 
designed and an experimental model to study network performance through 
instructing the controller with a considerable number of required preventive 
rerouting is developed. 
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1.6 Thesis outline 
In chapter two we present an extensive study of previous works in network protection 
and failure recovery. The reviewed literature is studied under four different categories; 
deterministic failure models, probabilistic failure models, enhancing network resiliency 
using topological parameters and proposed recovery approaches in SDN.  Chapter three 
explains network protection and failure models. In this chapter, the effect of probabilistic 
approach on the network and restoration mechanism is explained and a model to assign 
failure probability in wave-like disasters is examined. Network performance using several 
simulation models studies the effect of deterministic and probabilistic failure in different 
disaster scenarios. In chapter 4, we present a preventive protection model to enhance 
network resiliency in large-scale failure scenarios. Rerouting strategy and risk decision 
parameters are discussed in this chapter and the performance of the proposed model is 
evaluated under different failure scenarios. Chapter 5 investigates the effect of risk 
parameters adjustment on network performance and provides a procedure to study an 
extensive range of possibilities in risk decision parameters adjustment and the effect of 
each model on network is evaluated. In chapter 6, we improve the preventive protection 
model by providing a self-adaptive approach to keep network decision adaptable with 
network conditions. We describe a model that adjusts risk decision parameters 
dynamically in tune with network requirements. Design a protection model in SDN 
network using the preventive protection mechanism is discussed in Chapter 7 and the 
controller performance in response time to update a number of considerable data flow 




Chapter 2:  Literature review 
To improve the stability of a network and enhance network resilience, it is necessary to 
increase the ability of the network to cope with failures, which is commonly termed 
“network survivability”. For this purpose, many approaches have been proposed in the 
literature over the past three decades. We focus primarily on network survivability in 
large-scale failure cases.  
In general, the prior work can be grouped into two different aspects of spreading 
failures and outcome damages in the network. One approach is a deterministic view of 
failures in which all network components in the affected region will become definitely 
inoperative and will not have any chance of maintaining functionality. In the other 
approach, a probabilistic destruction view is applied in which a network component has a 
chance to survive the disaster and continue operation. Depending on how failure 
behaviour is considered, the proposed method to improve network protection may be 
different. Both approaches have provided valuable results and will be reviewed in the 
following.   
As software defined networking (SDN) is an emerging technology and of interest to 
researchers in both academia and industry, we have dedicated a separate subsection to 
review and discuss some recent works in SDN and its contribution to network 
survivability.  
2.1 Network resiliency with deterministic failure view 
A number of restoration methods and recovery time studies in large-scale scenarios 
have been presented in the literature. Path restoration performance in large-scale failure 
scenarios have been studied in [9]. In that work, a basic regional large-scale failure model 
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was developed and network capacity requirements and failure notification time were 
analyzed using simulation.  The authors noted that in a highly mesh network, a fairly 
small extra spare capacity in the network could provide a high ratio of restoration for 
affected demands in regional large-scale failures. The study used a circular impact with 
fixed radius as a model for regional failures. 
Categorizing links in a Shared Risk Link Group (SRLG) is an attempt to provide a 
measure of failure dependency into the scenarios. The SRLG model attempts to group 
together links or nodes that share common failure risks. Such risks can be shared ducts, 
power sources, or geographical area. SRLG disjoint path pairs is an approach to improve 
network resiliency by reducing the risk of a backup path failure. In this case, there is no 
bandwidth sharing between protection paths. The proposed models intend to solve a min 
sum problem [10, 11]. 
In [12] the authors considered one type of shared resource called “region.” All links in 
a region belong to one SRLG and failure in this region causes failure of all of the links. 
The authors applied this approach to model the impact of earthquakes. The divided 
regions in the network topology were mapped to the different seismic zones. The seismic 
map was used in the SRLG assignment and each zone formed its own risk. Because 
individual seismic zones were large, the authors expected an earthquake to affect one 
region only, and they divided each zone to have multiple SRLGs. This method was 
applied to minimize the number of shared SRLGs between the working and backup paths, 
using a seismic map of an earthquake as an example of a natural disaster scenario that 
created large-scale correlated component failures. However, pre-planned protection 
methods required a substantial amount of spare capacity in case of large-scale failure. 
In studying the damage levels caused by large-scale failures, packet delivery ratio is 
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one of the metrics to evaluate degradation of network performance. The authors in [13] 
showed that increasing the number of impacted network devices in a large-scale failure 
scenario and deterministically eliminating them significantly decreases the ratio of the 
number of packets sent from the source to the packets received on the destination side. 
The authors examined three area-based failure scenarios named scaling circle, moving 
circle, and scaling polygon. The failure scenarios were simulated using the NS-3 network 
simulator [14]. The authors introduced a regional large-scale scenario called “scaling 
circle” to model electromagnetic pulse attacks. The failure of components started from a 
centre and expanded with a constant velocity in every simulation time. The results 
showed how the type and strength of the impact, such as the number of damaged network 
equipment and the coverage of the affected area in large-scale failure directly affects 
network performance. The authors simulated scaling circle by expanding the failure 
impact radius and calculating the lost aggregate packet delivery ratio (PDR). In this study 
it was assumed that as the impact radius increased, all nodes and links within the impact 
area are failed. PDR was computed and the relationship between the PDR drop and the 
number of failed links and nodes in the circle was studied.  
Assessing network vulnerability was studied in [15] and failures were modeled as a 
line segment or disk shape. This study indicated the most vulnerable locations in the 
network where disasters could have maximum damage and degrade network efficiency 
significantly. The authors employed a polynomial-time algorithm to identify the worst-
case line segment and circular cut where any network components intersected by the 
failure would be destroyed.  
A design for survivable networks with multi-path routing was developed in [16]. The 
authors developed an end-to-end protection switching called self-protecting multi-path, 
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which used several disjoint paths to carry traffic between the source and destination. This 
approach allowed for load distribution in failure events. In the proposed model, if the 
network failure affected a partial path, only traffic on the affected path should be 
rerouted. In the normal situation, the traffic was distributed according to a load balancing 
function through available parallel paths that might have different lengths. In a failure 
event, another load balancing function redistributed the traffic of the affected path among 
the other available working paths. The authors measured required spare capacity and 
showed that the proposed model improved network resiliency with less extra capacity 
requirement in failure scenarios. The proposed load balancing function was optimized by 
minimizing the maximum link utilization of all protected failure scenarios [17].  
Connection availability can be considered an important metric to calculate Quality of 
Service (QoS) in a survivable network [7]. The authors assumed that different 
connections may have different availability requirements, which are typically based on 
the agreement between a service provider and a customer. Considering this requirement, 
they developed a dynamic connection provisioning for single-failure scenarios, where 
network component failures might happen independently. The proposed model based on 
Service Level Agreement (SLA) requirement provided three service models: no 
protection, shared-path protection, or dedicated protection to an incoming connection. 
The authors mentioned that maximizing backup-sharing could decrease the value of the 
cost function but could also decrease connection availability. To address this issue they 
limited backup sharing to improve availability.  
Random regional failure was modeled as a disk shape cut to study network 
survivability in geographically correlated failure scenarios in [18]. The authors developed 
a model based on region-disjoint, self-protecting, multipath routing based on a load 
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balancing mechanism. The proposed model sets up two or more working paths in an 
MPLS network and route traffic with a different ratio between them. The available spare 
capacity in each working path could be used to backup each other in failure scenarios. 
Numerical results studied in two real network topologies, the U.S network and NFSNET, 
and a comparison was provided for three different disjoint routing models: multiple node-
disjoint paths routing, multiple region-disjoint paths routing, and self-protecting multi 
region-disjoint paths routing. Network throughput as a metric of network efficiency was 
studied in multipath routing in both protected and unprotected forms. 
Multiple region fault models were studied in [19] for connectivity issues in a wireless 
environment. The authors mentioned that failures in a network could be considered 
locally and they developed a model based on region-disjoint paths. The maximum 
number of region-disjoint paths and minimum region cut were found by two heuristic 
algorithms. The authors employed region-based connectivity as a new metric in [20] to 
involve the concept of locality in network fault-tolerance ability and extended the 
resiliency study from single-region failure to multiple regions.  
Authors in [21] proposed a measurement of network resiliency to develop a model in 
computer network management. The proposed resilience factor considers network 
topology aspects such as number of redundancies and also the amount of traffic losses in 
failure scenarios. The proposed metric can be used by network managers to support 
decision making regarding the design of a new network or improve the performance of 
the operational network. The proposed model was simulated in the Brazilian National 
Research Network (RNP), and by employing a resilience factor, they analyzed how 
changes in the topology affect the network and its traffic.   
 A path restoration solution with quality of service consideration and label constraints 
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in MPLS networks was developed in [22]. The authors considered constraint based 
routing (CBR), which is a combination of shortest path first algorithm and network 
resource information such as link capacity or available bandwidth. The proposed model 
maximized network operation in different classes of traffic in both 1+1 and 1:1 protection 
mechanisms. In 1:1 method, low priority traffic (in this case best effort) was routed 
through the backup path prior to the failure events. The optimization problem in this 
article considered traffic engineered Label Switched Paths (LSPs). 
MPLS fault management consists of three methods: global backup, reverse backup and 
local backup. Some factors in quality of services such as packet loss, restoration time and 
resource consumption could be considered to select an appropriate recovery method in an 
MPLS network [23]. In different scenarios with varying traffic classes based on Diffserv, 
different weights can be assigned to the packet loss, restoration time, and resource 
consumption. A function of these parameters was employed to compute and recommend 
the best backup protection approach. 
Path diversification is a mechanism to achieve maximum flow reliability between 
source and destination nodes using a diversity measure [24]. The idea of using path 
diversification is extended to develop the path geo-diversification approach [25]. The 
proposed model considered geographical diversity of physical network topology to route 
traffic. The main objective in this research is to route the traffic around the endangered 
area by determining vulnerable locations in the network and estimating the disaster 
boundaries. The authors assumed that there is available exact information about the 
damage or some sort of estimation. To select an alternative path with acceptable distance 
as the backup path, the proposed algorithm considered different possibilities. If the 
disaster boundary is known, traffic would be routed through a path outside the challenge 
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area. If only an estimate of the disaster location is available, an ack request field which is 
added to the routing header, will be employed to route traffic through the nearest 
geographically diverse path. If there is no estimation about disaster and only occurrence 
of disaster just been notified, the ack request is set to true for all the packets sent out for 
next-hop acknowledgment.  
The above approach is improved by providing two heuristics for solving the path 
geodiversity problem [26] and reduce the complexity of the proposed model in [25]. The 
WayPoint Shortest Path (iWPSP) algorithm selects viewpoints with a specific distance to 
a middle node on the shortest path between source and destination and employs Dijkstra‟s 
algorithm to find the geodiverse path. In the Modified Link Weight (MLW) heuristic, the 
algorithm modifies the link weights and using Dijkstra‟s algorithm determines the 
geodiverse path. The distance value d would be provided as a user value, and during the 
disaster events, users can modify d based on determined disaster models to pass traffic 
around disaster zone.  In a simulated model, it is assumed that the disaster zone is 50 km 
and the proposed model can reroute traffic outside the danger zone. The results of PDR 
and delay compared to standard OSPF.  
Backup path selection in our proposed model compared to [25, 26] is independent of 
user interaction, alternative paths for traffic rerouting are selected dynamically, and 
adjustable protection parameters are provided based on the network status at each time. 
Additionally, our proposed model only considers the epicentre as a starting point for the 
disaster, dynamically monitors disaster expansion, and is not limited to a pre-assigned 
disaster boundary. Estimating a boundary for natural disasters with varieties in destructive 
power and damage behaviour may be hard or infeasible.  The probabilistic time-varying 
approach that is taken in our proposed model distinguishes it from the above research 
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when it needs to consider network components as operational or faulty.    
Routing instability caused by multiple failures in large-scale failure challenges can 
lead to shortest path first throttling and a longer convergence time. Multi-Topology 
Routing (MTR)  has been employed as a solution to mitigate failure effects caused by 
large-scale events [27]. Using MRT extension in OSPF, pre-determined virtual topologies 
are used to reroute traffic in failure events and isolate the affected part of the network. 
The authors developed two MRT-based algorithms called Geographic Coverage MTR 
(gcMTR), which creates a set of topologies to provide coverage across the network and 
Geographic Targeted MTR (gtMTR) to generate virtual topologies using pre-knowledge 
of likely disaster events. Another proposed algorithm in this study was developed to 
detect a geographical challenge and select a topology for traffic rerouting.   
In the above approach, for each vulnerable location in the network, a topology will be 
generated assuming a specific radius for each potential disaster. In the generated 
topology, link weights for the vulnerable area are increased to keep the shortest path tree 
away from that disaster area. Thus, geographical challenges have less impact, such as 
OSPF routing convergence delay time. The authors considered deterministic failures 
within a fixed pre-determine radius for the challenge area. The results indicated that if the 
selected topology radius is bigger than the event size, it could reroute traffic around the 
vulnerable area. However, for an event size larger than the selected topology radius, the 
proposed algorithm was not able to reroute traffic to a suitable distance outside the 
vulnerable area.  Although IP routing protocols are able to compute alternative paths and 
reroute traffic in failure scenarios, they are too slow for large-scale failure cases. The 
proposed preventive protection model in this thesis is not limited to a disaster boundary in 
order to reroute traffic out of a danger zone as it adjusts itself in tune with disaster 
19 
 
expansion through a probabilistic dynamic approach. The proposed recovery approach is 
also suitable for the network backbone, where routing mostly relies on methods such 
MPLS or WDM for fast recovery. 
Dedicated path protection as a solution in survivable elastic optical network (EON)  
was studied in [28]. Routing and spectrum allocation in dedicated path protection was 
formulated in Integer Linear Programing (ILP) problem and two metaheuristic 
optimization algorithms based on Tabu search were developed to address optimal solution 
in large size networks. 
In geographic routing, each node determines its location and the destination location to 
send packets without knowledge of network topology. Failure in a network may cause a 
dead end problem in geographic routing. To  address this issue  in geometric routing, 
recovery mechanisms are discussed in [29]. Tree-based greedy embedding was 
considered in this research and connection availability of geometric routing evaluated for 
a single failure problem. Component availability is another metric that has been used to 
study network performance and it is defined as the probability that a component is 
operational at any random time.   
A developed model in multiple link failures using link-based restoration with MPLS 
Fast Re-route (FRR) is discussed in [30]. Three approaches to improve network 
protection in multiple failures are proposed such as: a collection of spanning trees where a 
spanning tree is added for each possible edge failure, parallel edges that create a backup 
path for each edge, and disjoint spanning cycles. The proposed network designs can 
address multiple failures by adding a small number of edges to the current topology 
without causing disconnection or congestion. 
 It is a common assumption in deterministic failure models that network components 
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will fail with certainty as long as the failure event occurs. However, natural disasters in 
most large-scale failure events are probabilistic in nature. 
2.2 Network resiliency with probabilistic failure view 
Probabilistic failure models can be used to design a survivable network using pre-
planned backup paths with minimum mutual failure probability [31]. Joint failure 
probability can be minimized by formulating the backup path selection as an Integer Non-
Linear Problem (INLP). As explained earlier, a pre-planned protection mechanism could 
be costly and may be infeasible in the case of large-scale failures. 
Improved network survivability in overlay networks was studied in [32]. A model was 
developed to find a backup route with the minimum joint path failure probability with the 
working path. Although it is possible that the selected backup path is disjointed from the 
working path in overlay layer, they may share some physical links. The authors assumed 
that overlay link failure probabilities are small and employed exponential physical link 
failure models. They calculated overlay link failure probability based on independent 
physical link failure probabilities and the backup path routing problem was formulated as 
an Integer Quadratic Programming (IQP).    
Identifying vulnerable network locations in the event of probabilistic failure scenarios 
can be used to redesign connectivity or add extra capacity to improve network resiliency. 
To assess vulnerable locations in the network, failure probability can be calculated using 
a grid partitioned-based model as in [33]. In a related study in network vulnerability [34], 
regional failure events such as earthquakes or floods were modeled as random line-
segment cuts. The authors applied geometrical probability theory to develop a grid 
partitioned-based estimation model to locate vulnerable network parts and developed a 
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model to determine single and pairwise link failure probabilities. 
Survivability in layered networks in the event of a failure in the physical layer and its 
effect on the logical links as multiple failures was discussed in [35]. The authors 
developed a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for the failures and eliminated 
resampling for different values of link failure probabilities. Random failures were 
assumed for physical links with low-failure probability. The proposed model, however, 
did not sufficiently model the impact of a large-scale failure event in which failure 
probability can be considerably high in the epicentre. 
Correlated link failures with a probabilistic approach were presented in [36]. The 
authors developed a model to study stochastic disasters, considering that they could be 
spatially correlated. Failure correlation may be used to assign higher failure probability in 
specific areas to implement more failure events. The main contribution of this model was 
to identify vulnerable network locations.  
Probabilistic geographical failure has been discussed in [37]. The authors studied 
probabilistic approaches and developed algorithms considering pre-computed protection 
plans. The proposed model makes it possible to indicate the vulnerable locations in the 
network. However, the pre-planned protection scheme is infeasible in cases of large-scale 
failure.  
A number of different network failures and their impacts were studied in [38]. The 
authors introduced a taxonomy of the variety of network challenges and developed a 
framework to evaluate the effect of different failure scenarios such as probabilistic 
uncorrelated random failures in non-malicious problems and deterministic failure in 
large-scale scenarios. The framework simulates different challenge scenarios using NS3 
to evaluate network performance.  
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In [24], path diversification was employed to design and evaluate survivable networks. 
The proposed algorithm was able to select a set of alternative paths with different 
diversities while meeting performance constraints.  The authors also explained a measure 
of diversity that takes into account physical distance as opposed to a measure that solely 
relies on node or link disjointness. For this purpose, several networks were studied with 
different ranges of effective path diversity (EPD) thresholds. The metric in this study to 
indicate the level of topology survivability was flow robustness while it was computed 
with increasing link and node failure probability. The authors improved network 
resiliency by applying a path diversification scheme. The proposed model was simulated 
in different topologies and the results were used to evaluate the network survivability 
degree. 
For a selected set of paths between the source and destination, path diversities were 
aggregated and shown as the effective path diversity [39]. The average of effective path 
diversity of all node pairs within the graph was considered as a metric for total graph 
diversity and employed to estimate network survivability in case of simultaneous failure 
of nodes and links in probabilistic failure scenarios. The authors simulated a probabilistic 
failure model using 51 failure probabilities evenly distributed over the range of 0-0.5. The 
failure probability incremented until the range of all values was complete. Using the 
proposed metric, connected nodes in each failure scenario were computed.    
A risk-based model was studied in [40]. The authors developed a model to design 
survivable networks based on managing risk. The main goal of this study was to spend a 
fixed budget in the best part of the network to enhance network resiliency. Different risk 
management based approaches for survivable network design were proposed. 
Network survivability with prioritizing connections in restoration and protection 
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approaches was studied in [41]. The authors proposed a model that does not transfer all of 
the data flow to the backup path during a failure event but only reroutes high priority 
traffic through available resources. They considered a differentiated recovery mechanism 
taking into account different priorities. This approach was able to increase the recovery 
ratio of traffic with higher priorities. The failures were generated with a random 
distribution function and only single failures were assumed at each time. 
Considering prior knowledge regarding link failure probability, end-to-end path failure 
probability can be computed. With this knowledge, it is possible to select working and 
backup paths with the minimum joint path failure probability. Using risk minimization 
and employing traffic engineering, a path pair protection can be developed in multi-
failure scenarios [42].  
Network protection in WDM networks for the case of multiple link failure was 
discussed in [43]. The authors proposed a protection mechanism by developing two 
algorithms for path selection and connection unavailability determination. The protection 
scheme was developed by providing a list of protection paths while having optimum load 
balancing in the network.   
 
2.3 Enhancing network resiliency using topological parameters 
Node and link betweenness are among the parameters that are of concern to network 
researchers to evaluate network performance or estimate network vulnerability. Authors 
in [13] showed that selecting links and nodes with higher betweenness in an intentional-
failure scenario had a higher impact on the network efficiency compared to random links 
and nodes failure. Failures in a few nodes with high node betweenness could reduce 
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network efficiency significantly. 
Betweenness centrality and resistance distances can be used in the design and control 
of communication networks [44]. A weighted random-walk path criticality routing 
algorithm may be able to select the best backup path with minimum total cost in a shared 
backup protection approach. Betweenness centrality and its relationship to random walks 
were discussed in [44] to develop the proposed routing algorithm.    
Assessing network vulnerability and detecting vulnerable locations in the network for 
further improvement has also been a goal in the research on network resiliency in the face 
of failures [15, 36, 45, 46]. A metric to study network vulnerability using normalized 
average edge betweenness as a vulnerable index is discussed in [46] and the vulnerability 
of several networks was studied using this metric.  
Betweenness centrality can also be employed to assess network vulnerability for 
random damage or malicious attack in a complex network [47]. The authors introduced 
link-based multi-scale vulnerability with integrating power and link betweenness for 
complex networks. The proposed approach was employed for link placement in a network 
that produces the maximum resistance in case of malicious attack 
Node and link betweenness and other centrality metrics can be used to develop a 
framework to analyze the robustness of multilevel networks [48]. The authors discussed 
the impact of removing network components (nodes and links) on network performance 
and flow robustness.  
Node betweenness and other node centrality parameters can be employed to design 
heuristics for node removal strategies to efficiently determine and remove important 
nodes from a complex network to minimize network performance [49]. This approach is 
commonly used in a situation when the objective is to eliminate specific nodes in a 
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complex network such as disease or criminal organizations. 
In a cascade failure, damage in one part of the network can lead to failure of the other 
successive parts. Authors in [50] examined vulnerability in power grids network in the 
case of cascading failures. The proposed model in this approach employed an extended 
betweenness metric, which is a combination of power-flow with network structure to 
define the load of power grid to analyze network stability. By simulating selective attack 
strategies the vulnerability of different grid networks were evaluated.  
Optimizing a current network or improving the design of future networks requires an 
understanding of the impact of network challenges. The framework presented in [38] is a 
simulation-based approach to study network performance in face of failures. In this 
approach, critical nodes and links are determined using nodes degree connectivity and 
links and nodes betweenness centrality. The authors argued that the impact of failures on 
the network is influenced by the period of disaster, the number of network components in 
the impact zone and the importance of damaged parts.  
Node betweenness can be used to specify the average loaded traffic on a node. A 
connected link to the node with high betweenness needs more capacity to deal with more 
encounter traffic. Considering link capacity as the bandwidth of the link, the effect of the 
traffic utility and utilization ratio of bandwidth was examined under random and 
intentional attacks in complex network in [51]. 
Network management in complex networks can be improved by quickly locating the 
fault point in the network. Authors in [52] discussed that in the event of failure on a node 
with higher betweenness, the possibility of failure occurring on the other nodes within the 
shortest path of the failed node is higher. The proposed algorithm based on node 




Network criticality is defined as the ratio of random-walk betweenness of a node or 
link to its weight, which shows the same value for all links or nodes in the network. This 
factor can be used as a metric to evaluate network robustness [53]. A shared backup path 
selection approach based on using weighted random-walk path criticality routing can be a 
solution to address network survivability issues. In this case, a path with minimum effect 
on the network criticality is considered as a robust path that can be a good candidate for 
the primary or backup path [53]. 
A measurement to evaluate network robustness under multiple failure scenarios is 
discussed in [54]. Random and targeted attacks were examined to determine the level of 
network robustness. Several metrics were selected to form targeted attacks such as node 
degree, betweenness centrality, clustering coefficient and spreaders. The results indicated 
that some networks are more robust based on the selected attack parameter than other 
networks. A lower betweenness centrality value in some simulation models indicates less 
centrality for the network components and decreases vulnerability on targeted attacks.  
 
2.4 Network resiliency in software defined networking (SDN) 
Software defined networking technology is considered one of the latest approaches in 
network developments. Here, we study some recent protection approaches and proposed 
methods using this technology. Network resiliency has been studied in several different 
ways, such as improvement in fast notification to the controller, development in dynamic 
restoration, or pre-planned protection mechanisms.  
A comparison of the current forwarding algorithm in POX controller [55] has been 
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discussed in [56]. Evaluating current forwarding algorithms in POX controller can help 
network researchers study SDN reliability issues with better understanding. In the case of 
failures, adjacent nodes to the failed link are able to detect the failure and find another 
link in parallel of the failed link to transfer traffic through. If a secondary link is not 
available, the adjacent nodes try to find a common node in their adjacency list to reroute 
traffic. Traffic received by the common node is then sent to the destination. It is possible 
that a common node cannot be found in their adjacency list. At that point, the adjacent 
nodes to the failed link try to find a path with a two-hop distance between each other, 
where each hop is connected directly to each adjacent node. The selected path temporarily 
transfers traffic to provide protection against packet loss until the controller determines 
the shortest path and establishes it. Monitoring link status in POX controller is done by a 
discovery module that sends and monitors link layer discovery protocol (LLDP) packets. 
The authors mentioned that the recovery process with this mechanism consumes about 4-
5 seconds [56].   
SDN Controller is responsible for processing LLDP messages in a restoration 
mechanism. Although increasing the LLDP interval may speed up the recovery process, it 
can increase overload on the controller significantly [57]. To accelerate the recovery 
process without increasing the burden on the controller, it is possible assign this job to 
OpenFlow switches [57]. In this case, probe packets are sent from the tunnel entry point 
(source node) to the destination in each path. If the destination node fails to receive the 
probe packets, it is possible that some nodes or links in the path will face problems. In the 
proposed mechanism, the destination node switches to an alternative path that is selected 
from table group entries.    
In another approach, backup paths for each single failure scenario are determined and 
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upon the failure event, the flow is transferred through the computed backup path [58].  
Working and backup paths are assigned different priorities in this approach. To keep pre-
established backups path alive and prevent them from deletion by the controller as unused 
paths, renew packets are designed to be periodically sent through these paths. The pair 
nodes involved to detect failure will remove flow entry from the failed link from the 
switch by an auto-reject mechanism and transfer flow to the backup path. If the failed link 
is physically repaired, the adjacent switches inform controller by sending port status 
messages. 
Adding recovery action to OpenFlow switches using the group table concept is 
proposed in [59]. Group table includes group entries to perform different actions. A 
protection mechanism is implemented in each group entry. Each group entry has an action 
bucket with alive status. If one action bucket is indicated as unavailable, the next 
available bucket executes the appropriate actions. The status of each bucket is determined 
through port state monitoring or bidirectional forwarding detection (BFD). The proposed 
approach could apply to fast recovery in failure events without involving the controller.  
The above studies respond to failure events through a reactive approach and are mainly 
focused on a single link failure scenario. Our objective in this research is to develop a 
proactive protection approach with pre-knowledge of potential failures that may affect a 
part of network. The proposed model is not limited to a single failure problem and can 
improve network resiliency in large-scale failure scenarios such as natural disasters or 
power outages. Considering SDN technology and its features, preventive protection 
model [60]is fully appropriate and consistent within this concept.  
Previous research shows a lack of a comprehensive model capable of taking 
topological properties of the disaster zone into account and dynamically adjusting the 
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protection approach to enhance the network resiliency level. Although in probabilistic 
protection approaches failure probability of network components is employed to develop 
a protection model, this factor has not been used to improve network resiliency against 
upcoming failures. Moreover, in most probabilistic failure research the method of 
determining failure probabilities for network components is not dynamic. The studied 
literature also does not provide an efficient protection model capable of adapting its 
strategy in a proactive and dynamic way, considering changes on the network topology 
caused by failures. The literature also shows a shortage of proactive models that can 
reduce network damage simultaneously with the development of regional devastation. In 
addition, previous studies do not provide an approach to predict the upcoming damage on 
network components caused by large-scale disasters. 
Considering these shortcomings of previous studies, we aim to enhance the network 












Chapter 3: Network protection and failure models 
3.1 Background  
Several models in the past three decades have been proposed for network failure 
recovery [61-64]. The proposed techniques can be roughly divided into two main 
categories [6]: protection methods where an alternative disjoint path is pre-established 
along with the primary path to reroute traffic in case of failure, and dynamic restoration 
methods where an alternative route is established after detecting a failure. A data path 
from source to destination node in a network may consist of several links.  Both dynamic 
restoration and protection techniques can be applied to improve link or path failure 
recovery.  
In a pre-planned link protection, for each link in the primary path, a backup path with 
enough resources is considered. In a dynamic link restoration approach, the end nodes of 
the failed link participate to discover a route around the failed link.  
In a path protection scheme, end-to-end backup path for each connection (from source 
to destination nodes) is determined and adequate resources are allocated. It is also 
possible to share the allocated resources among backup paths. In an end-to-end dynamic 
path restoration mechanism, the source and destination nodes of each connection 
participate to calculate and establish a backup route once a failure is detected. In this case 
we will have a complete traffic rerouting between the origin and destination nodes.    
Dynamic restoration methods are more efficient to utilize network resources and 
applicable in different failure scenarios. However, pre-planned protection methods are 
faster than dynamic restoration methods as the backup paths are pre-established and 
restoration is guaranteed. All possible failure scenarios should be considered when 
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allocating adequate network resources for each one (required more cost). Path and link 
protection methods are illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Path and link protection. 
 
In the case of single failure scenarios, recovery is possible using pre-planned disjoint 
backup paths; however this approach may not be feasible in dynamic large-scale failure 
scenarios. Although establishing several disjoint backup paths may enhance the 
probability that at least one of the paths survives, it significantly increases the total cost of 
additional network resources required for network survivability. This issue is studied in 
[65]  and  an analysis of multiple failure restorability for pre-planned link protection is 
provided. Therefore, in large-scale failure scenarios, our focus is on a dynamic response 
that allows us to salvage as much traffic as possible and reroute the affected traffic using 
the available paths in the post-failure network. Considering the characteristics of the 
large-scale failure, the restoration technique could be an appropriate approach to enhance 
network resiliency. 
We recall here, in general, disasters can be modeled in two different aspects of 
spreading failures and outcome damages in the network; a deterministic view of failures 
or a probabilistic view.  
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dynamically and gradually decreasing to zero. Our focus is therefore on probabilistic 
failure models, which are more realistic compared to deterministic failure approaches. In 
this regard, we explain the network model and associated failure probabilities for the 
network components in this chapter. We will also study the restoration mechanism as a 
dynamic approach that is able to protect data flow when the network encounters an 
unpredictable probabilistic phenomenon such as natural disasters. In order to provide a 
model to assign possible failure probability for network components, we will study 
earthquake destructive behaviour, which has the strongest destruction effect among 
natural disasters. In the rest of this chapter, we will provide a comprehensive study of 
network protection by examining deterministic and probabilistic failure models.      
3.2  Our network model 
In this section, we explain our network model and the method to estimate the 
probability of failure in large-scale failure scenarios and describe characteristics of 
network components that are involved in a failure scenario. The proposed model also will 
be employed to study the restoration mechanism and explain a method to compute 
required restoration time.  
3.2.1 Network and failure probability model 
To model an impacted network by a disaster, we assume that the range of the disaster 
follows a circular pattern that expands with time. Besides the affected nodes and their 
connected links, some crossing links may be affected too while their end nodes remain 
intact. Here we describe how the dynamic failure probability is calculated in our model.  
 We consider a network graph G= (V,E) where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of 
links. A link from node i to node j is represented by    . A crossing link    
  is considered 
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as a link where the end nodes     are out of the impact area but parts of the link    
   have 
been impacted. In a time-varying model, the failure probability tends to vary with time. 
Let the impact radius at        be     We denote failure probability of link         as 
  
  (  )        and for node      as   
  (  )       .  
In this thesis,    for a node is the distance   from the epicentre at time  . We assume 
that the impact radius increases with time, which is a valid model for disasters such as 
earthquake or nuclear explosion. To compute probability failure for a link (            
  ), 
the minimum Euclidean distance from the epicentre to the link is   . Figure 4 shows an 
example that illustrates crossing links and nodes within the impact area.  
 
 
Figure 4. Network with crossing link and an impacted node. 
In Figure 4, node A is connected to link L1. Impact radius at      is Ra and at      
is extended to Rb. Node A is impacted at      . The failure probability for Node A and 
the connected link can be shown as   (    ). This failure probability is applied to link L1 
for further end-to-end path failure probability in the preventive routing model. The 













      from the epicentre. 
The closest point of the link to the disaster epicentre has been used in calculation of the 
failure probability of the crossing link. In this example, the failure probability of the 
crossing link, L2, can be shown as   (    ).  
We define the set   as failure events caused by expanding the impact radius. Each 
failure event   ( ( ))    occurs at t and once a failure event happens, node      may 
fail with probability  
  (  )       . We assume that   
  (  )     if ni is outside the 
impact range    and all nodes and links outside of the impact area remain in working 
status. At each simulation time step, a probabilistic engine will determine whether each 
node will fail or not. We further assume that all connected links to a failed node will be 
failed and unable to carry network traffic, as they have lost one end node. Network 
restoration will be applied to the new network topology after removing all failed links and 
nodes.   
An important difference between the single failure restoration approach and large-scale 
scenarios is that in the latter, the post-failure demand matrix is different from the original 
demand matrix, because demands from/to failed nodes should be removed from the 
matrix as they become un-routable [9].  
Given that the area affected by natural disasters may have a great extent, the selected 
strategy to cope with the problem is different with single or double failure scenarios. On 
the other hand, we assume that the proposed protection model is applicable to backbone 
networks where the transmission media is mostly relay on fiber optics. As this technology 
can handle substantial amounts of traffic, the required capacity for data transfer is not a 
concern. We also emphasize here that, in a large-scale failure scenario, full restoration 
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(100%) of all network demand is infeasible because some demand originates from or 
destined for nodes that are damaged and thus are no longer in the network. Removing 
demands of the damaged nodes in the network actually releases extra capacity for 
rerouting other connections. However the required spare capacity may be different in 
each large-scale failure scenario, corresponding to the severity of the damage. 
To simulate disaster models and evaluate the performance of our proposed approach, 
we assume some possible failure probabilities in selected distances away from the 
epicentre. Selecting values for the probability of failure are such that to simulate a model, 
close to natural disasters behaviour.  The assigned value to failure probability parameters 
can also be replaced with any other desired values.  
3.3 Travelling wave concept in failures 
One of the main factors in creating large-scale failures in communication networks is 
an earthquake, which has the highest destructive effect among natural disasters. The 
destruction caused by an earthquake is due to the release of energetic waves that decrease 
gradually over time. In this section, the characteristics of the generated waves by 
earthquakes are studied in order to provide a model to compute failure probabilities of 
network components. In the proposed model, impact ranges and failure probabilities vary 
with time. Considering the similarity of damage among nuclear explosions, earthquakes, 
hurricanes or floods, the proposed model can be calibrated or extended to identify 
required resources to provide the expected level of reliability.   
3.3.1 Destructive wave attributes  
Waves travel through space and time and transfer energy from one place to another. 
The released energy of natural disasters or nuclear attacks can generally be modeled as a 
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travelling wave, where energy decreases as the wave expands.  
Travelling waves can be grouped as transverse or longitudinal. In a transverse wave, 
the medium displacement is perpendicular to the direction of propagation of the wave and 
causes the medium to move up and down. A type of seismic wave called secondary wave 
or shear wave is known as a transverse wave. In a longitudinal wave, the movement in the 
medium is in the same direction to the motion of the wave, which means that the wave is 
seen as the motion of the compressed region. Seismic waves called P-type and explosion 
waves are examples of longitudinal waves. Figure 5 shows transverse and longitudinal 
waves. 
 
Figure 5. Transverse and longitudinal waves. 
A one-dimensional wave equation with amplitude y  can be shown as [66]: 
 , sin( )y x t A kx t                                                                                                    (1) 
In equation (1), A is the maximum amplitude of the wave and x is the space coordinate. 





  and   is the wavelength.  t is the time 
coordinate and   is the angular frequency which is 2 f  .  
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Total energy (kinetic and potential) carried by one wavelength in a travelling wave is: 
2 21
2
E A                            (2)   
 is the mass per unit length.                
As v f , the associated power carried by the wave is:    
2 21
2
P A v                                                                                                              (3)
    
We model a large-scale failure scenario by assuming that the failure starts from an 
epicentre with the highest degree of damage, and expands across the region at a constant 
velocity during a limited time. Destructive energy in the earthquake originates in an 
underground point, which is called the focus. An epicentre is the point on the earth‟s 
surface, directly above the focus. The released energy at the epicentre propagates through 
the surface and causes failure. Figure 6 shows the seismic waves and the epicentre.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Seismic waves and epicentre. 
38 
 
3.3.2 Failure probability estimation  
The damage caused by the earthquake depends on the amount of the initial wave 
energy. As the seismic waves travel farther away from the epicentre, the amplitude of the 
waves decrease because of geometric spreading. The geographical area also has a 
damping capacity known as material damping. A combination of them can be shown as 
following:  
     (    ⁄ )
     (     )                   (4) 
   and    are amplitudes of motion at distances           from the source.   is the 
attenuation coefficient and depends on the type of material through which the wave 
passes. n is the power depending on the type of wave (can be 0.5,1 or 2) [67].  
Considering (2), the relationship between wave energy and amplitude is      which 
can be employed to calculate the associated energy at the specific location in the impact 
area. 
By expanding the impact area, the destructive energy of the disaster decreases and as a 
result, we assume that the probability of failure is reduced with distance. Based on energy 
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
                              (5) 
where   is defined as decay rate and can be considered as a decrement parameter based 
on energy reduction behaviour and v is the wave velocity.  Each failure event      may 
occur at distance x, from the epicentre by traveling wave with assumed constant velocity 
v.  Once a failure event,    happens, node i VN   may fail with the probability failure in 
(5).       
According to the given explanations of the travelling wave properties and considering 
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that the released energy in a destructive natural phenomenon decreases exponentially with 
increasing distance, we assume an exponential decay model to calculate failure 
probabilities of network components in this research rather than using normal (or 
Gaussian) distribution or a predefined list of values. 
3.4  Restoration Mechanism and disruption time 
We use an MPLS-like model for implementation of the restoration mechanism here, 
because of its relevance and applicability to backbone networks. MPLS provides a set of 
protocols for managing and controlling the core network that has been considered as a 
suitable solution for QoS management in IP network. MPLS improves traffic engineering 
by integrating layer 2 and 3 of Open System Interconnection (OSI) model. Label 
switching, the main part of MPLS design, is able to execute fast packet forwarding. Label 
Switching Router (LSR) by employing Label Distribution Protocol establishes Label 
Switching Path (LSP).On the edge of the network,  Ingress LSR (I-LSR) picks up 
unlabeled packets adds labels to them  and forwards them through LSP [68].  
Restoration time in MPLS-based networks has been studied in [69]. The authors 
discussed recovery time in MPLS networks in both protection and restoration methods. In 
this thesis, we consider a dynamic restoration scheme in MPLS-based network, where the 
backup path is setting up after failure detection.  
 





Start of Recovery Operation
Path Traffic Recovered
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
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The recovery scheme can be accomplished by adjacent nodes to the failure, or by the 
source node of the flow. Authors in [70] have  provided an MPLS recovery cycle model 
(Figure 7).  The recovery cycle model is composed of five separate time slots. 
Fault Detection time (T1) is the amount of the time needed by adjacent nodes for 
failure detection. Hold-off time (T2) is a pre-determined time assigned to the lower layer 
protection to wait prior to MPLS-based recovery action and can be set to zero. During 
notification time (T3), the source node of each flow receives the failure notification 
message and I-LSR starts recovery operation in (T4). Traffic will be rerouted during 
traffic recovery time (T5). Once the recovery operation is finished, the destination nodes 
receive the traffic again. The total restoration time is T1+T2+T3+T4+T5.   
In this research, without loss of generality, we assume that the notification delay can 
be negligible for the adjacent nodes to the failed link. When the source node receives the 
failure notification message, it calculates a new path and sets up a new Label Switching 
Path (LSP) by the signaling protocol.  Two types of messages employed in the signaling 
are Path messages and Reserve (Resv) messages. We consider the network disruption 
time as: 
 Notification time (∑         
 
   )   Path messages delay(∑         )
 
     
Reserve messages (∑         )
 
   .                                                                              (6) 
Here,     is propagation delay on link       and      is processing delay on node Ni 
  V, n is the number of nodes on the path between the nodes that detects the failure and 
the source node and m is the number of nodes between the source node of the flow and 
the destination node. In a large-scale failure scenario, we need to restore several failures 
at the same time. In this case, restoration time can be computed as an average or 
41 
 
maximum required time to recover the network.  
 
Figure 8. Global restoration mechanism  in an MPLS network [69]. 
Figure 8 shows an example of a dynamic restoration scheme in an MPLS network.  In 
this example, node A detects a failure on the adjacent link and sends a failure notification 
message to the source LSR.          
        
3.5 Performance evaluation: probabilistic vs. deterministic failures 
We evaluated the efficiency of the proposed model in large-scale failure scenarios 
under several different scenarios, in order to provide a meaningful comparison between 
deterministic versus probabilistic as well as static versus dynamic methods. 
We first provide a comparison between deterministic and probabilistic large-scale 
failures with an assumption that failure probability is constant throughout the disaster 
expansion. We later show how the change from this constant probability model to our 
dynamic probabilistic model affects the performance. This model evaluates network 
performance between these different approaches. The model is simulated using 
MATLAB and applied to the European network COST-239 (Figure 9). The network 
consists of 11 nodes with an average nodal 7 and 26 links. Using a coordinate vector as in 














connection between nodes.  
 
Figure 9. COST-239 network topology. 
A unit end-to-end demand matrix is considered for each pair of nodes. A weighted 
shortest path algorithm is used to route each demand. The working capacity of a link is 
defined as the sum of all demands routed through that link [9]. To simplify our analysis 
and without loss of generality, we assume that the epicentre is always one of the network 
nodes and we compute the average result for all the nodes. The maximum impact range 
studied in this model is 500 km. 
We studied large-scale failure models with constant failure probability in two different 
scenarios. In the first scenario, we assumed a constant failure probability for the entire 
disaster duration and each involved node and link in the impact area face a certain 
probability of failure. The model is simulated in four different failure probabilities: 20%, 















Table 1. Disaster model with constant failure probability in entire disaster region 



























100% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
Case 2 100% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 
Case 3 100% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 
Case 4 100% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
 
If the network is partitioned, the traffic flows from one partition to another cannot be 
restored. By expanding the impact range in each interval, the algorithm determines nodes 
and links within the impact area. 
In the second scenario, we assumed a constant failure probability limited to a 
geographical area with a fixed reduction in failure probability between the regions.  We 
considered a decrement rate in the range of 15%, 20%, 25% and 30% and employed it to 
reduce the failure probability for each 100 km of disaster expansion. This model aims to 
simulate a situation where the failure probability decreases with distance by expanding 
through the regions. Table 2 summarizes the failure probability parameters. All the other 
parameters in this model are the same as the parameters in the simulation model when the 













































 100% 85% 70% 55% 40% 25% 
Case 2 20% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0 
Case 3 25% 100% 75% 50% 25% 0 0 
Case 4 30% 100% 70% 40% 10% 0 0 
 
3.5.1 Performance results 
In this section, we present the results obtained from modeling large-scale failure 
scenarios with deterministic and probabilistic damage patterns and provide a comparison 
between them. In order to evaluate network performance in each failure scenario, we 
studied several important metrics such as the number of failed network components and 
the percentage of the lost demands.  
We also computed the required network restoration time in each failure scenario. 
Figure 10 illustrated the studied performance metric when the failure probability is 






Figure 10. Simulation results with constant failure probability in the entire impacted area.  




































Case 1( Failure Probability=80%)
Case 2( Failure Probability=60%)
Case 3( Failure Probability=40%)


































































































































Case1(Failure probability with reduction rate =15%)
Case2(Failure probability with reduction rate =20%)
Case3(Failure probability with reduction rate =25%)









































Case1(Failure probability with reduction rate =15%)
Case2(Failure probability with reduction rate =20%)
Case3(Failure probability with reduction rate =25%)








































Case1(Failure probability with reduction rate =15%)
Case2(Failure probability with reduction rate =20%)
Case3(Failure probability with reduction rate =25%)
Case4(Failure probability with reduction rate =30%)
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Next we analyze the results obtained for each of the above simulation models and 
explain network performance. 
3.5.2 Performance analysis and discussion 
Figure 10 shows the results obtained for a simulation model with a constant failure 
probability across the entire impacted area. As can be seen, the average number of 
damaged network components in the deterministic failure scheme is significantly 
different from the probabilistic failure approaches especially when the failure probability 
decreases. The simulation results show that there can be a difference of 25% in the lost 
demands with the probabilistic failure model compared to the deterministic failure model. 
This difference in the lost demands indicates how considering a failure probability with 
different values can affect the obtained results. The results also show the difference in the 
required restoration time between the deterministic and probabilistic failure models with 
different failure probability values. In all cases, deterministic failure model needs more 
restoration time. 
In Figure 11, we present the results obtained by simulating disaster models with a 
constant probability of failure in a limited geographical area with a fixed reduction 
between regions. As can be seen, the average number of damaged network components 
and also the average percentage of the lost demands are directly affected by changing the 
probability of failure. In a failure model, a greater reduction in the probability of the 
failure leads to a fewer number of network components being damaged. This difference 
also can be seen clearly in the amount of the lost demands, when the failure probability 
reduces faster through the impact area.  
By looking at the required restoration time, the deterministic failure model and the 
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probabilistic failure model with less reduction value almost show the same average 
restoration time. With an increasing reduction rate in the failure probability, the 
difference between deterministic and probabilistic failure models shows significant 
changes. 
3.6 Performance evaluation: wave-like probability failure models 
We improved the proposed model by computing the failure probability of each impact 
expansion based on energy reduction behaviour. Decay rate is the employed parameter to 
compute failure probability. We assume a disaster‟s wave travels with a constant velocity 
v and the probability of the failure will be reduced with decay rate . 
We applied our model to the European network COST-239. Dijkstra‟s algorithm is 
employed to route the demand for each link through the shortest path. We simulate the 
proposed model for each node as the epicentre and a constant failure expansion velocity 
of 10 km/s. We assumed the impact radius would expand at the rate of about 10 km/s, up 
to maximum 500 km at a constant speed. 
We assumed an earthquake-like model for disasters. The propagation velocity of the 
waves in an earthquake depends on geographical characteristics and earth materials which 
can be up to 8.5 km/s [71]. We used the propagation velocity of 10 km/s as the worst-case 
scenario. This range of impact is assumed to be a circle which the radius R , at ( )time t s  
is ( )R r km and at ( )time t T s  is 10 ( )R r T km  . 
In order to implement a proactive approach, we assume a natural disaster early 
warning system is in place, or that the first failure is detected by the network itself. We 
assume full disruption/failure at the epicentre. As the disaster typically spreads in seconds 
to minutes while our rerouting algorithm can operate within tens to a couple of hundreds 
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of milliseconds, there is enough time to prevent paths from upcoming damages. 
Three different scenarios have been studied: fast, medium, and slow decay. We 
assumed failure probability in the fast decay model is 40%, 60% in the medium decay 
model, and 80% in the slow decay model when 100 km away from the epicentre. As we 
explained earlier the selected values of decay rates aim to model the failure probability in 
such a way that the model is built like an earthquake. Using exponential decay, the energy 
reduction is faster compared to a linear approach through the region.  The proposed 
model is not limited to the selected values for the decay rate and can be examined with 
any other values. The decay rate in each failure probability scenario is calculated and 
shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Decay rates for probability of failures 
Decay rate Failure probability in 100 km far away 
from the  epicentre 
0.01783 (slow decay) 80% 
0.05108 (medium decay) 60% 
0.09163 (fast decay) 40% 
 
The average number of failed network components, required restoration time and the 
percentage of the lost demands are the metrics that are studied in this simulation model. 
3.6.1 Performance results 
Here, we present results of modeling failure probability using wave-like attributes 
(Figure 12). The studied metrics are the number of failed network components, the 
average of lost demands and also the delay time required for network restoration. The 
results include three different decay rates compared with a disaster scenario using a 
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3.6.2 Performance analysis and discussion  
Figure 12 shows the results obtained by simulating a large-scale damage model with 
wave-like failure probability. The three different scenarios show that in the case with a 
higher probability of failure, the number of affected network components and the average 
percentage of the lost demands caused by the damage are higher. The lost demands in the 
probabilistic approaches may be significantly less than deterministic failure models and 
are highly dependent on the speed at which wave energy decays. 
In the fast decay model, the probability of failure reduces significantly as the disaster‟s 
wave spreads through the region. It means network components at a distance from the 
epicentre have a greater chance of survival. The fewer number of damaged network 
devices leads to time savings and less delays in the restoration mechanism.  
3.7 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we studied network performance using two different views of failure; 
deterministic and probabilistic. For each failure approach, we examined several different 
scenarios through simulation models. A deterministic failure model is compared to two 
probabilistic failure models, where the failure probability is considered fixed throughout 
all the disaster scenarios for all components. We then studied another model where the 
failure probability is considered to be fixed only for a specific region and the value 
changes for the next understudy region with a fixed value reduction. Our main goal was 
to study several different models to give a comprehensive view of the difference between 
deterministic and probabilistic failure models and their outcomes in network performance 
for disaster scenarios.  
We have extended the view of probabilistic failure by considering a wave-like model. 
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In the proposed model, failure probabilities follow a time-varying model and change as 
the disaster spreads. The proposed model is inspired by earthquake behaviour, which 
starts from an epicentre and expands through the region where it loses its energy and 
destructive power as it is expanding. The studied model would give a more realistic 





















Chapter 4: Preventive protection model 
Natural disasters are among the main destructive factors in large-scale failure 
scenarios. While each proposed protection model (chapter 2) using dynamic or pre-
planned protection mechanisms deals with some aspects of large-scale failure 
management in communication networks, there is still no comprehensive solution that 
takes the unique features of major disaster scenarios into account; namely the facts that 
these events are dynamic and the situation on the ground changes rapidly. The impact 
range of a disaster event expands with time and simultaneous probabilistic failures occur 
during the impact. Most solutions take static post-event approaches in which either the 
network must be significantly overdesigned to be able to cope with the immediate impact 
of a disaster, or use restoration efforts that take too long to respond to changes in network 
conditions as the disaster impact spreads. The dynamic behaviour of natural disasters and 
their probabilistic failure pattern indicates a need for a dynamic probabilistic protection 
approach to address the issue and reduce the number of disrupted connections in the 
network.   
Our objective here is to propose a proactive approach that would allow network 
operators to salvage as much backbone traffic as possible while the disaster event is still 
in effect. Our technique is predictive, dynamic and probabilistic at the same time. As 
opposed to previous studies, which used static failure probabilities, our technique builds a 
dynamic probabilistic model and updates it as the impact of failure (e.g., earthquake) 
spreads. Our technique is also proactive, for example it evaluates the reliability of paths in 
real time during the disaster impact period and makes preventive rerouting decisions 
based on the risk level.  
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4.1 Proactive time-varying protection concept  
Here, we present a novel preventive protection method, which would be appropriate 
for dynamic disaster scenarios such as earthquakes, nuclear explosions or hurricanes. The 
proposed method can be used to increase the resilience level of the network by employing 
preventive rerouting.  
We recall from the study of previous works that most of the developed models in 
large-scale failure events focused on indicating the vulnerable parts of the network for 
further improvement and not developing a real-time solution in case of disasters. To keep 
network functionality at an accepted level, it seems necessary to mitigate disaster effects 
in the current working network. The core concept of the preventive protection model is to 
reroute high-risk connections prior to failure to reduce the number of disrupted 
connections in disasters scenarios. 
4.1.1 Compute end-to-end path failure probability 
The preventive protection method is probabilistic and dynamic. In order to implement 
a proactive approach, we assume a natural disaster early warning system or that first 
failure detection by the network is in place and the network management system is able to 
receive notification of the occurrence of a disaster, as well as continuing reports about 
how it expands. For the purpose of this work we use an earthquake disaster model; i.e., a 
disaster impact area that starts from an epicentre and expands with time. 
Once a network failure is detected, an exponential decaying rate for failure probability 
is computed based on the level of intensity of the disaster and the available background 
knowledge of the geographical characteristics of the area. This factor can be employed to 
calculate failure probability for each component in the network. This model has been 
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presented in [72] and has been discussed in Chapter 3.  
Although we employed an exponential decay model to compute the failure probability 
for each network component in this study, any other approach capable of estimating 
failure probability can be used in this model. It makes the proposed model applicable in 
any large-scale failure scenario such as nuclear explosion or natural disasters whenever 
the failure probability for the network components can be estimated (theoretical or 
empirical).  
We assume that a single link can survive the impact with a probability of     
  (  ).  
Each path in the network may consist of several links. The regional dependence between 
the failures of links and nodes in an area is included in calculating individual probabilities 
of failure, as we explained in Chapter 3. Once the probabilities are determined, we can 
assume that failure events happen independently. With the above knowledge, end-to-end 
path failure probability is computed as: 
   ( , ) 1 1 ( )
ij
ij
f i j f t
e E
P path P R

                                                                                (7) 
For example in Figure 13, failure probability for a link between node A and B is 
shown as ( , )f A BP  and the probability that this link survives the failure is  ( , )1 f A BP . 
 
Figure 13. Failure probabilities for links. 
The end-to-end path failure probability in Figure 13 for the source node A to 
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Or if data is sent through nodes D and E: 
  (   )
      ((  (  (  )))  (  (  (  )))  (  (  (   )))) .                              
4.1.2 k-shortest paths failure probabilities computation 
Depending on the network topology and epicentre of the disaster, several alternative 
paths from the source to the destination may be available for each affected connection. In 
this step, the existing k-shortest paths are computed and the outputs are sorted with the 
shortest path first. For each source node i and destination node j we may have a group of 
shortest paths as: 
1 2( , ) , ( , ) ,..., ( , )kpath i j path i j path i j  
Using equation (7), we can calculate the end-to-end probability of failure for each path 
as:       ( , ) ( , ) ( , )1 2, ,...,f i j f i j f i j kP path P path P path  
The calculated failure probability for each shortest path from source node i to 
destination node j will be further employed in preventive rerouting strategy.  
Figure 14 is an illustrative example of an expandable disaster model. There are several 
paths available between nodes A and B, two of which are highlighted. Failure 
probabilities are illustrated in different colours for each impact radius and decrease as the 
impact expands. The path k1 utilizes links 1 and 2 and the alternative path k2 consists of 





Figure 14. Network with expandable failure and k-shortest paths. 
4.2 Preventive rerouting strategy  
The main strategy for data flow protection in the preventive protection model is to 
reroute traffic of endangered paths before failure and as a result reducing the number of 
disrupted connections. The paths that are close to the epicentre are considered high risk 
and their traffic should be rerouted through the other paths with further distance to the 
epicentre. As the destructive power of natural disaster waves decreases with distance 
from the centre of the incident, the proposed preventive rerouting strategy and switching 
traffic to an alternative path between source and destination nodes may reduce traffic 
damage probability.  
A group of shortest paths may be available for each source and destination nodes with 
different end-to-end failure probabilities for this purpose. To reroute traffic through more 
reliable paths, preventive protection models employ risk threshold parameters to decide 
how to reroute traffic through more reliable routes. For example, in Figure 12, links 1 and 














end-to-end path failure probability. In the proposed method, based on the defined 
thresholds, we assume the appropriate action is to switch demands from A to B through 
path k2 (links 3 and 4), which has a lower end-to-end failure probability.    
4.2.1  Preventive decision parameters 
Having different paths with different failure probabilities gives us a holistic view of 
the intensity of the approaching failure in the network. We may anticipate that a path with 
a higher failure probability would be more fragile in the face of expanding disaster and 
traffic through this path is in danger. To address this issue, the proposed model should be 
able to distinguish at-risk paths and make an appropriate decision to switch traffic 
through more reliable paths. 
Here we define two decision making parameters; upper threshold (   ) and lower 
threshold (   ). We denote the lower threshold as            and the upper threshold 
as          . Paths with an end-to-end failure probability higher than     are 
considered endangered paths with data flows that need to be protected. We apply     to 
define a „safe zone‟ for the paths with a lower end-to-end probability of failure, therefore 
having more chances to survive. 
4.2.2  Pre-failure protection 
Figure 15 illustrates an example of the preventive rerouting mechanism and protecting 




Figure 15. Preventive rerouting prior to failure. 
To reroute traffic we consider three possible scenarios based on assigned threshold 
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a)  ( , )
1
Lof i jP path T  
In this situation, the first computed shortest path has a lower failure probability than 
the lower threshold. We assume this path falls in the safe zone and has a good chance of 
surviving the approaching damage. This path can therefore be considered reliable for 
passing traffic flows and no rerouting is required. This path can also be selected as a 
reliable backup path for preventive rerouting.  
b)  ( , )
1
Upf i jP path T  
The end-to-end probability of failure is higher than the upper threshold, which means 
that the path is more likely to fail in the future (i.e., a path in the „danger zone‟) and an 
upcoming damage can disrupt this connection. The proper action is to find another 
shortest path in the lower threshold zone and reroute traffic flows through it prior to 
failure so that they will not be disrupted once the disaster impact area reaches this path. If 
the preventive method could not find a path in the lower threshold zone, any path with a 
lower failure probability than the current path will be selected to reroute the traffic. 
c)  ( , )
1
Up Lof i jT P path T   
In this scenario, the first found shortest path remains as the working path. We keep this 
path as a working path but will not use it as a safe backup route for others. If this path 
fails, the preventive protection model tries to reroute its traffic through the path in the safe 




Figure 16. Preventive protection model. 
The difference between upper threshold and lower threshold can be chosen by the 
network designer based on the desired level of survivability and the available resources in 
the network. 
In all of the above scenarios, if the number of available k-shortest paths is one, it is 
considered to be the best candidate path. Having several shortest paths is directly related 
to the network topology and the failure intensity. In highly damaged networks, more links 
and nodes will fail and as a result, less network resources will be available to reroute 
traffic. 
4.3   Performance evaluation 
To evaluate the performance of the preventive protection model, we adopt the 
following metrics: 
a) The Number of Disrupted connections: Any disruption in network operation can lead 
to loss of data and impact network performance. To ensure continued system operation in 
the case of a disaster, a dynamic path restoration mechanism tries to reroute demand of 
the disrupted connection through a backup path. The proposed model aims to decrease the 
number of disrupted connections to improve network survivability. 
b) Network Disruption time: Disrupted connections need time to be recovered. We use 
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the Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) service time model for our computation, as it 
provides a good model for connection-oriented backbone services. 
c) Number of preventive rerouted connections: In the proposed method, we apply the 
upper and lower threshold to compute substitute paths with a desired level of the end-to-
end failure probability. 
 An implementation of our preventive protection scheme can be summarized as 
following: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Preventive protection scheme 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
While Impact radius < maximum radius  
    Compute impact area  
         For all components within impact area: 
                 Determine failure probability 
                    Fail/not fail each network component (using a loaded coin-toss   probability model) 
                    Remove failed nodes and links from the network 
                    Compute end-to-end path failure for each demand 
                    Based on upper and lower threshold: 
                           Reroute failed demands to the preventive paths 
                           Reroute likely to fail demands to the preventive paths  
                    Calculate number of disrupted connections 
                    Calculate network disruption time 
                    Calculate number of preventive rerouted connections 
         End For; 
        Wait for notification about expansion of impact radius 




The computed worst case time complexity of the proposed algorithm for the number of 
links |E|  and nodes |V|  is O(|V
3
|) which is polynomial and feasible to achieve.  
The process to calculate alternative paths and reroute traffic prior to failure works in 
the background and does not interfere with the current traffic flow in the network. 
However, it will increase the network processing overhead during the computing process. 
The above metric is directly related to how the values of the upper and lower thresholds 
are adjusted. It can be utilized to improve network performance based on the available 
resources and the expected resilience level. 
In preventive rerouting procedures, when the substitute path with the acceptable level 
of end-to-end failure probability is computed and established, the traffic of the current 
working path is switched. We assume that the switching time is negligible, therefore this 
operation allows the traffic between the two nodes to flow continuously. 
To evaluate network performance and validate the observed results, four real-world 
network topologies; Cost239, TeliaSonera, Sprint and Level 3 (Figure 9 and Figures 17, 
18, 19) with different nodal degrees are employed to simulate the proposed model. 
 
 




Figure 18. Sprint network 
 
Figure 19. TeliaSonera network 
We study the network performance for each network topology in four different 
scenarios. In each scenario we simulate the proposed model with different threshold 
ranges to illustrate how the selected upper and lower threshold can affect network 
performance. 
In our simulations, we compared our results with the deterministic failure scenario, 
which is the scenario used in prior large-scale failure analysis, e.g. in [9] in order to 
provide a view into the impact of considering probabilistic failures and probabilistic 
countermeasures on the overall robustness of the network. Table 4 shows the selected 
topologies to simulate the proposed model.  
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Table 4. Real world topologies specifications 
Network Coverage Nodes Links Avg. Node 
Degree 
Cost239 Europe 11 26 4.7 
TeliaSonera U.S. 16 29 3.6 
Sprint U.S. 28 76 5.4 
Level 3 U.S. 38 376 19.7 
 
In each simulation scenario, we chose one node of the network as the epicentre, and 
then we simulated each scenario 50 times in order to collect sufficient sample data for 
statistical analysis. Each case was run in four different scenarios as shown in Table 5 and 
shows the selected thresholds ranges in each scenario. 
Table 5. Selected threshold ranges for simulation model. 
Scenario1 Upper threshold = 50% 
Lower threshold = 25% 
Scenario2 Upper  threshold = 75% 
Lower threshold = 25% 
Scenario3 Upper threshold = 75% 
Lower threshold = 50% 
Scenario4 Upper threshold = 80% 
Lower threshold = 40% 
 
The network performance for each topology was studied for 40 seconds as assumed 
disaster duration. The probability failure in this study is computed with the Decay rate 
(φ)= 0.01783. 
4.3.1 Performance results 
Each figure in this part includes the results obtained from the dynamic path restoration 
mechanism as well as our proactive protection approach to show the effectiveness of the 
preventive protection model. The results have been computed as an average value among 
all the nodes and illustrated with the corresponding time of the disaster duration. For each 
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simulated topology, we illustrate the following parameters: 
 average number of disrupted connections 
 average network disruption time (ms)  
 number of preventive rerouted connections.  
We assumed that the disaster duration is about 40s and the proposed model is 




































































































Figure 20. COST-239 network performance. 



















































































































































Figure 21. Sprint network performance. 




















































































































































Figure 22. TeliaSonera network performance. 
















































































































































Figure 23. Level3 network performance. 
  And finally we show the results for the Level3 network in Figure 23.  
4.3.2 Performance analysis and discussion  
We assume the duration of a natural disaster is about 40 seconds, at which point its 
destructive energy reaches zero and the disaster ends. As we considered that the disaster 
propagates with a constant speed of 10 km/s, it covers an area with a radius of 400 
kilometers, which is a considerable geographical area. In our simulation model, the 
network performance of the affected area in different discrete time intervals is 
investigated.   
The proposed preventive protection model was successful in reducing the average 
number of disrupted connections in all of the studied topologies regardless of how the 
threshold ranges are selected. The results among different threshold ranges indicate that 
the selected range has a direct effect on the network performance. In this case, a 
preventive protection model with a lower value for the upper threshold (Upper threshold 
= 50%) saved more connections compared to the other scenarios because the proposed 




















































The selected threshold range in the proposed model determines the required rerouted 
connections to increase the network protection level. The results revealed that to provide 
better protection more connections need to be routed (Upper threshold = 50%), which 
means more overload on the network. Based on the available network resources and the 
desired protection level, an appropriate threshold range can be considered 
The other performance metric studied in this research was the network disruption time. 
The results show the preventive protection model could significantly decrease the average 
network disruption time in all simulated topologies. The selected threshold range in each 
scenario provides a different level of improvement, which can be employed by network 
designers to acquire the desired level of resilience. 
4.4  Concluding remarks 
The proposed preventive protection approach is a novel mechanism to improve 
network protection and demonstrates the ability to enhance network resiliency in large-
scale disaster events. Determination of endangered flow paths can be used to switch their 
traffic through reliable paths prior to failure. This approach can save connections against 
upcoming damage and reduce the number of disrupted connections in the network. To 
indicate endangered and safe paths two parameters (upper threshold and lower threshold) 
are employed in traffic rerouting and risk determination. A proper adjustment in threshold 
parameters can lead to enhanced network protection in failure events. The network 
performance as a result of applying the proposed preventive approach was studied for 
different failure scenarios among a variety of real-world network topologies. The results 
showed that the proposed model was able to reduce network disruption and improve 
network performance significantly under large-scale failure scenarios.  
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Chapter 5: Risk parameters adjustment 
The preventive protection scheme essentially implements some important components of 
a risk management system for backbone networks. The general framework of risk 
management in communication networks has been described in detail in [73]. It identifies 
four aspects of risk management: risk framing, risk assessment, risk response and risk 
monitoring. The preventive protection algorithm mainly deals with risk assessment and 
response. For risk monitoring, we assume some kind of a natural disaster early warning 
system, such as alarms from a network of sensors or first failure detection by the network 
nodes, is in place. We further assume that the network management system is able to 
receive notification of the occurrence of failures and continuing reports about how they 
expand.  
For risk assessment in this work we use an earthquake disaster model; i.e. a disaster 
impact area that starts from an epicentre and expands with time. The idea in preventive 
protection is to assess the failure probability for each network component such as a link 
or node using mathematical models in each decision interval[60]. The current risk model 
is limited to using the relative power of the earthquake wave to evaluate the probability of 
failure. Our review indicates that more comprehensive models for the impact of such 
disasters on telecommunication equipment do not yet exist. Also, while the focus of our 
work is on regional and geographically-contained disasters, the proposed response 
methods can also be employed in other types of large-scale failures, such as cyber-
attacks, provided that proper risk assessment models are developed for such cases. 
To mitigate risk failures in a communication network, we should consider the 
relationship between risk and vulnerability. Applying protection to vulnerable flows 
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against upcoming threats may reduce the size of damage. In this case high risk flows that 
are vulnerable to damage should be transferred to a safe area based on the selected risk 
thresholds. The essential factors influencing the preventive protection model are decision 
rerouting parameters that specify high-risk and safe zones in the impacted network. Once 
the end-to-end failure probabilities for the k- shortest paths between each pair of nodes 
are calculated, the preventive protection scheme reroutes the endangered traffic. This 
decision is based on the chosen upper threshold that indicates the high risk zone. 
Although one may expect that selecting a low value for upper threshold would give 
better protection, it also requires more rerouting, which means more bandwidth overhead 
and higher restoration delays. 
The importance of adjusting decision parameters, their impact on network 
performance, and the provided level of protection motivated us to conduct a 
comprehensive study on this matter.  
In this section, we develop a procedure to parameterize rerouting decision factors in a 
preventive protection model to study the effect of different risk threshold values on 
network performance.  
5.1 Initialization risk parameters procedure 
The assigned value to the upper risk threshold indicates the endangered zone and based 
on this parameter, the preventive protection model will predict upcoming failure for the 
traffic passing through this area as the disaster expands. By changing the upper risk 
threshold factor, the extent of the high risk area will be changed. We recall that the lower 




In order to study the effect of the risk threshold parameters on network performance, 
we initialize the upper risk threshold parameter to the highest acceptable value 
(predefined). This initial value implies the minimum number of preventive rerouting, 
because by decreasing the upper risk threshold, more and more traffic flows will have to 
be rerouted. By reducing a predefined fixed value of upper risk threshold, the lower risk 
threshold will be computed and assigned. By increasing the difference between the upper 
and lower threshold values, we expect that the endangered traffic will be transferred 
through a safer area and therefore protect against failure. Obviously, a more secure area 
should be further away from the epicentre, which means a longer path for the data flow.  
The proposed procedure will start with the highest assigned upper risk threshold value 
and the computed lower risk threshold. At each decision interval (determined by changes 
in network conditions, predefined intervals, or based on expected expansion of failure 
impact range), the probabilistic failures for network paths are calculated and a simulation 
analysis of the number of preventive rerouted and disrupted connections is conducted. 
Results for each decision interval are recorded and depicted as a trend for all studied steps 
to give a comprehensive view of the impact of adjusted risk thresholds parameters on 
traffic protection and network performance.  
After examining all the possibilities for the upper risk threshold parameter and 
recording the obtained results for each decision interval, the proposed procedure increases 
the difference value between the thresholds and repeats all of the previous steps to obtain 
new results that depict a new trend for further study. We increase the distance between 
the thresholds to assess how these differences may affect network efficiency when the 
preventive model tries to reroute traffic through safer areas. 
Here we recall that to reroute traffic through the safe zone it is necessary that a 
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preventive protection model is able to find a path in this area, otherwise the endangered 
data will be rerouted through any available path with a probability of failure lower than 
the current path or leave the flow untouched. Given this circumstance, even with an 
increasing difference between the thresholds, the proposed model may not be able to pass 
information through better routes. We show the steps of the proposed procedure for 
threshold adjustment operation in Figure 24.  
 
Figure 24. Thresholds adjustment flowchart. 
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In the illustrated flowchart,    is the assigned difference between upper and lower risk 
thresholds. Different protection scenarios can be modeled by assuming a fixed upper 
threshold and increasing    to compute and assign a lower threshold.     is a decremental 
factor to initialize the upper threshold in each successive step by reducing the upper 
threshold to a new value in each simulation scenario. This parameter can be adjusted 
based on the number of required failure scenarios and the expected data results for further 
process.   
5.2 Risk mitigation effectiveness  
Rerouting traffic prior to failure is a fundamental aspect of increasing the protection 
level in the preventive model. Using this approach, the number of disrupted connections 
decrease and the provided resiliency level improves. Upon failure detection, the proposed 
model is triggered to transfer information while the disaster expands. Since the preventive 
rerouting process occurs in the background, it does not interfere with network operation; 
however it may increase the network overload with the rerouting procedure.  
Given that failures in a natural disaster scenario follow a probabilistic pattern, it is 
important to decide which paths are in danger and require immediate protection and also 
how to determine more reliable paths to reroute the endangered traffic. It should be noted 
that routing traffic through longer paths will increase delays and may lead to increased 
costs. The selected backup routes should provide the required protection level while 
adding the least cost to the network. It is also important to mention that rerouting 
connections with a low failure probability and have a higher chance to survive the disaster 
only increases unnecessary overhead on the network. To address these issues, the proper 
values must be assigned to the upper and lower thresholds, which can affect network 
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performance significantly.  
In summary, the objective of the adjustment threshold procedure is to achieve the 
minimum number of required rerouting that would provide an acceptable disruption ratio. 
If the expected disruption ratio is still too high, the upper threshold is lowered in steps 
until the desired disruption levels are achieved.  
It should be noted that as the failure model in our research follows a probabilistic 
pattern, the results of each failure scenario may be different. To address this issue, each 
failure scenario will be studied under several simulation runs.  
5.3 Performance evaluation 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the thresholds adjustment procedure by 
modeling different large-scale failure scenarios.  The disaster failure in our work has been 
modeled as a circular region whose radius expands with a constant velocity (rough model 
for an earthquake). The network components in an impact area can be nodes and their 
connected links or part of links. We assume that the failure probability of a node is the 
same as its connected link. The closest part of each impacted link by the disaster has been 
used to calculate the failure probability of the link. 
At any time, all network components outside the impacted area will be considered in 
an operational status, while those in the impacted area may fail with a dynamically 
calculated probability using a travelling wave model as in [60, 74]. The closest part of 
each impacted link by the disaster has been used to calculate the failure probability of the 
link. We assume that the failure probability of a node is the same as its connected link.  
We assume that if a node fails, all its connected links are failed and cannot transfer data. 
Obviously, full restoration of all flows in a large-scale failure scenario is infeasible. The 
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reason is that if the source/destination nodes of a flow fail, that flow cannot be rerouted.  
We assume sufficient capacity for rerouting exists in the network. Capacity optimization 
in large-scale scenarios is still under research.   
We chose TeliaSonera US L3 Network with 16 nodes and 29 links for our simulations 
[75]. We consider end-to-end unit demand between each pair nodes to generate traffic 
flows. To model the disasters, we assume that the epicentre is always at one of the 
network nodes. 
We simulate disaster scenarios for each node (16 nodes) and compute the average 
result for 100 simulation runs to allow accurate statistical analysis. The simulation 
scenarios are presented in Table 6.  
Table 6. Threshold differences range and upper and lower thresholds value in each scenario 
    :upper threshold,      :lower threshold 




















10%     95% 90% 85% 80% ... 25% 20% 15% 10% 
    85% 80% 75% 70% ... 15% 10% 5% 0 
20%     95% 90% 85% 80% ... 35% 30% 25% 20% 
    75% 70% 65% 60% ... 15% 10% 5% 0 
30%     95% 90% 85% 80% ... 45% 40% 35% 30% 
    65% 60% 55% 50% ... 15% 10% 5% 0 
40%     95% 90% 85% 80% ... 55% 50% 45% 40% 
    55% 50% 45% 40% ... 15% 10% 5% 0 
 
To simulate the proposed model we use predefined values for initializing the risk 
thresholds by considering a fixed difference between them. In each step, we deduct 5% 
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from the upper threshold to simulate a new failure scenario with updated threshold values. 
The simulation steps are terminated when the lower threshold value reaches zero. After 
simulating all steps in the predefined range, we expand the difference between the 
thresholds to simulate a new failure scenario. By expanding the distance between the 
thresholds, we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed model in four different rerouting 
decision models. By increasing the difference between thresholds in each failure scenario, 
the preventive model tries to find a backup path further away from the epicentre with a 
lower end-to-end path failure probability.  
The predefined assigned values in our model will cover a vast range of upper and 
lower thresholds with slightly different thresholds in each simulation step. Eventually, the 
obtained results for all steps are illustrated as a trend for further processing and analysis.    
5.3.1 Performance results 
Here we present the performance results of the proposed threshold adjustment 
procedure. We study the number of disrupted connections in the impacted network as an 
important metric to indicate the provided level of resiliency. The average number of 
disrupted connections for all nodes in different thresholds ranges (starting with the 
highest upper threshold) are computed and illustrated as a graph. In each simulation 
model, we assigned a fixed value to the threshold difference (i.e., 10%) and decrease the 
upper threshold slightly in each successive step to model different failure scenarios. The 
obtained results in each step have been depicted with a specific symbol on the graph. 
After simulating all steps in the selected range, the gap between the thresholds will be 
expanded to model a new failure scenario.  
Figure 25 illustrates the results of the adjustment algorithm on the average number of 
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disrupted connections. The graph shows four different failure scenarios with different 
distance values between upper and lower thresholds. The yellow line in the graph 
illustrates the average result for all the curves.  
 
Figure 25. Threshold adjustment results 
The rerouted traffic may increase network overload due to damaged links for 
preventive purposes. We therefore consider preventive rerouting as a metric for each 
failure scenario. To study this metric in each failure scenario, we assigned a fixed value to 
the threshold gaps and simulated failures through successive steps of a predefined range 
of upper thresholds. The studied upper thresholds in each scenario start with the highest 
value and decreases gradually to cover all the upper thresholds in the range. The average 
number of preventive rerouting for all nodes in each failure scenario is computed and 
illustrated as a graph.  
By increasing the distance value between risk thresholds, a new failure scenario has 
been modeled and the results recorded. In this study, we simulated the proposed 
procedure in four different failure scenarios. The assigned fixed value to the distance 
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between the upper and lower risk thresholds are based on Table 6 (10%, 20%, 30% and 
40%).  
The results in Figure 26 show the average number of preventive rerouting connections 
in four different threshold adjustment scenarios. 
 
Figure 26. Preventive rerouting in different threshold ranges. 
The studied network topology (TeliaSonera US L3 Network) contains 16 nodes 
(cities). Considering the assumption that the epicentre can be located in each city, we 
examined different failure scenarios and network performance was studied in each 
scenario (Figure 27). The results obtained for each node (epicentre) indicate the 
efficiency of applying a preventive model and the improved performance compared to the 
dynamic restoration approach.  
The studied metrics in each node are the average number of disrupted connections 
(preventive and dynamic restoration) and the average number of preventive rerouting. 
The average results have been calculated by performing 50 simulation model runs with 
the upper risk threshold of 70% and lower threshold of 60%. For each city (node) in the 


























































network, three metrics were calculated and the performance results are illustrated in 
Figure 27.  
 
Figure 27. Network performance for upper threshold= 70%. 
5.3.2 Result analysis and discussion  
As can be seen in Figure 25, there is a sharp reduction at around 70% of the upper 
threshold value, after which the graph decreases gradually. We can conclude that in 
general there is a trade-off point after which further reduction in the upper threshold 
increases the number of reroutings without significantly contributing to network 
robustness. The results in Figure 26 show the average number of preventive rerouting 
connections in four different threshold adjustment scenarios.  
The results show that different scenarios converge when the upper threshold is equal to 
50%. It shows that preventive rerouting can reach a point where the lower threshold at 
any value gives the same results. The reason can be the lack of available paths with a 
lower failure probability less than the lower threshold. In this situation, the preventive 
protection model reroutes the endangered or disrupted connections to any path with a 





















































































































































Disrupted connections (restoration model)




Figure 26 reveals that the upper threshold in the preventive protection model is the 
main contributing factor in determining the number of preventive rerouted connections 
and future disruptions. It is the main decision parameter for network operators. Once they 
choose an acceptable level of robustness (disruptions under large-scale failure scenarios), 
they can adjust the upper threshold to achieve that level with minimal rerouting 
operations.  
In Figure 27 we show network performance when the upper threshold is assigned to 
70% with lower threshold equal to 60%. As can be seen, the preventive protection model 
was successful in reducing the number of disrupted connections based on the selected 
thresholds. In the proposed model, disrupted connections are connections that are able to 
re-establish after failure. In this example, if an epicentre is located in Miami or Seattle, 
both the classical restoration method and preventive protection model are not able to 
restore the damaged connections, which implies that all demands have been lost. The 
results in Figure 27 also show that the performance of the preventive protection model in 
some nodes within the selected range of thresholds is significant. The geographical 
location of these nodes and the available path in the vicinity of the epicentre can affect 
preventive protection performance. 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we provided a method to refine the parameters of a preventive 
protection scheme in a dynamic and proactive manner with the goal of reducing the 
number of disrupted connections in large-scale scenarios. We showed why adjusting 
threshold parameters in this model have an important effect on protecting data flows prior 
to failure. We developed an algorithm to regulate decision-making probabilistic 
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parameters employed in preventive rerouting. The proposed algorithm analyzes network 
performance in different threshold ranges and records the results for each threshold value. 
The results obtained for different threshold scenarios can be processed by network 
operators to make decisions on how to adjust threshold parameters. The proposed 
approach showed that selecting the upper threshold plays the most important role in the 




















Chapter 6: Self-adaptive failure mitigation 
Here we recall, from the previous discussions that appropriate traffic protection against 
a time-varying destructive phenomenon serves to prevent damage before it occurs. In this 
case, the level of risk for traffic routes should be evaluated and the flow should be 
rerouted to more reliable paths prior to failure. The high-risk paths can be identified based 
on appropriate decision parameters in a preventive protection scheme as an effective 
dynamic probabilistic solution to address large-scale failure scenarios.  
In this section we develop a self-adapting preventive approach to improve the re-
tuning decision parameters. The proposed approach dynamically adjusts decision 
parameters to provide an appropriate level of protection while the impact domain of the 
natural disaster expands through the region and increases the risk of failure for network 
components. 
To develop the proposed model we consider topological properties in disaster domain 
such as network components centrality. In this regard, node and link betweenness are 
among the parameters that are of concern to network researchers to evaluate network 
performance or estimate network vulnerability. We determine the impact of such decision 
factors on the performance of risk-based proactive rerouting. 
A disaster event usually occurs for a limited time in a specific region and damages 
network components in a manner that can be considered probabilistic [72]. Proper 
protective actions must consider network topology and traffic flow characteristics in the 
disaster zone as well as the impact of failure on network performance. Protective actions 
must also be able to adapt dynamically with the damage spreading through the region as 
the disaster range and impact zone expands. The topological properties of the network 
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may be different in each interval decision time based on how many links or nodes fail. 
Therefore, a careful examination of the relationship between the topology of the network 
and the impact of the disaster on network operation could provide us with insights into 
how to adjust decision parameters according to dynamic conditions of the network. 
By improving the employed approach to initialize rerouting threshold parameters from 
a fixed and predefined manner to a dynamic and adaptive way, we could enhance the 
proposed preventive model to act as a perfect protection model in large-scale failure 
scenarios. Adding adaptation features to the protection model makes it appropriate for 
protecting data flows in an efficient way that facilitates network management.      
 In the following we examine a few important topological parameters that play a role in 
the network protection decision-making process. 
6.1 Network components centrality 
The strategic importance of some nodes or links in a network can be more than other 
network components. A node is important in this context if its removal affects the 
efficiency of the preventive protection. The importance of a node or link may increase the 
criticality of the paths that are using those components. One way to study the importance 
of nodes or links in a network is to evaluate its betweenness centrality. With the 
assumption that data between the source and destination takes the shortest path, our 
interest is to evaluate the importance of the network components using betweenness 
centrality. Freeman [76] discussed the importance of node betweenness, which counts the 
fraction of shortest paths passing a given node. The node betweenness for node v V  












                                                         (8) 
where s and d are the source and destination nodes of the flow, ξsd is  the total number of 
available shortest paths between s and d and ξsd(v) is the number of shortest paths 
between s and d  that pass through node v. 
Betweenness can also be applied to links by defining edge betweenness, which is the 
fraction of the shortest paths between two nodes that run along that link [77]. Edge 











                                                                                            (9) 
where ξsd(l) is the number of shortest paths through link l for the data flow between the 
node s and d.   
A failure event may change the relative importance of network components. A low 
betweenness centrality indicates a link that is not carrying much traffic flow. However it 
is possible that, due to changes in the network topology because of link or node failures, 
the shortest paths between pair nodes change as the disaster impact area expands. In this 
case a link that was previously determined to have low betweenness in the former 
topology may become part of the shortest paths in the post-failure topology and as a result 
receives a higher betweenness centrality. In this case, adaptive protection should consider 
paths using this link as risky paths for further action. Considering the dynamic changes in 
the network topology and the importance of adjusting the preventive threshold, we 




6.2 Preserving strategic importance links 
The destruction produced by a natural disaster expands dynamically, and over time the 
destructive energy gradually decreases to zero. The damage caused by natural disasters 
can therefore be depicted through a time-varying probabilistic failure model, which is 
more realistic compared to deterministic failure approaches. The seismic gap method may 
be employed for long-term earthquake forecasting. The assumption is that large 
earthquakes happen more or less regularly in the region and time because of the gradual 
accumulation stress and sudden release by failure [78]. However, they are not capable of 
identifying the exact location, severity of the disaster and the possible size of the 
vulnerable area. 
It should also be noted that the characteristic of the impacted area by the disaster has a 
significant effect on the damage rate. For example, the rate of damage of an earthquake in 
a crowded city may be higher than the same disaster in an uninhabited place such as the 
middle of a desert due to the existence of facilities such as residential communication 
networks, power grids and similar infrastructure.  
The above facts highlight the need for network disaster-protection approaches that are 
proactive and able to respond dynamically to changes on the ground as the impact range 
of the disaster spreads or moves. Such schemes should be able to predict the future risk 
posed to network traffic flows in real time and to take precautionary action, in e.g., 
rerouting high risk flows to low risk regions to minimize the chance of service 
disruptions. The most important question in designing proactive risk-based schemes is to 
develop decision factors for calculating the risk in real time and determining appropriate 
action based on the perceived risk. 
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6.2.1 Preventive Rerouting Threshold 
To improve the efficiency of preventive protection methods and to make them 
adaptable with network conditions, we merge upper and lower risk thresholds to one 
decision parameter called Preventive Rerouting Threshold (PRT). Any path with a failure 
probability higher than PRT is considered to be an endangered path and its traffic is 
rerouted through any available path with a failure probability less than PRT. If the model 
is unable to find a path under PRT, the best available path with the least failure 
probability is then selected to reroute the data. 
By determining the failed nodes and links in each inspecting interval as the disaster 
impact area expands, we obtain an updated topological status of the network. This 
information is used to recompute the PRT and adjust the decision parameters adaptive to 
network conditions. The main contributions of the adaptive model are as follow: 
 Decision parameters in preventive protection models will be initialized by 
network operators [60], however assigning value to PRT in an automated way 
can improve network management. PRT is computed based on the strength of 
the disaster, regional characteristics and network topology properties in the 
impacted area. The computed PRT based on the above knowledge is used in the 
protection approach. 
 PRT is updated as a disaster expands through the region and considering the 
network status in each interval. Adjusting PRT in each decision interval leads to 
an updated PRT in tune with the needs of network protection. 
 Adapting the protection model with network conditions helps to dynamically 
determine high-risk paths in each decision interval. It is possible that some 
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routes, which are considered to be safe paths in the previous interval, are 
detected as endangered paths with the updated PRT in the new interval and have 
to be rerouted prior to failure. This property eliminates the need for the lower 
threshold to determine the safe zone.  
The proposed model protects endangered paths by rerouting them through the safe 
zone that is dynamically determined in each decision interval. The process to compute 
and assign PRT parameter in the protection model is explained next. 
6.2.2 Self-adapting rerouting parameters 
A disaster may affect a limited geographical area. Rerouting traffic through paths 
outside the hazard zone is a static protection approach. The drawback of such static 
approaches is that rerouting all connections out of the disaster area is costly. In particular, 
considering that the impact range of the disaster is dynamically expanding, a static 
rerouting approach would have to be very conservative; i.e. predict the maximum possible 
range of the impact area and reroute all paths to the farthest regions outside this range, 
which would result in extremely long backup paths that would consume far more 
resources than the shortest paths.   
On the other hand, failures in large-scale scenarios follow a probabilistic pattern and 
each network device has a chance to survive the disaster. In this case, there is no need to 
transfer data from links with low failure probabilities with the intention of safeguarding 
their information. Additionally, traffic flow priorities can also be considered; i.e. high 
priority flows can be rerouted while flows with low priority or low probability of failure 
can be left for the next interval decision. 
An appropriate solution to calculate PRT is to consider failure probability and the 
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strategic importance of links. Figure 28 shows a disaster zone and the affected links and 
nodes. Each link in the disaster area contains a failure probability and an edge 
betweenness centrality. The end-to-end path failure probability in a network is greater 
than or equal to the minimum failure probability of the associated links[60]. If a link has a 
high failure probability we might argue that any path using that link is at risk. In this case, 
the failure probability of a link in the disaster zone can be used to assess upcoming path 
failure probability. 
 
Figure 28. Disaster zone and network topological properties. 
To evaluate the strategic importance of a link, we compute the value of link 
betweenness for each link in the disaster zone. Link betweenness centrality and link 
failure probability are used to assign a damage risk rate to a link for further protection 
action as follows: 
( ) ( )
l fP l bc l                             (10) 
Here, δl is the damage risk rate of link l with betweenness centrality bc(l) and failure 



























zone needs protection or not. To apply path protection, Pf (l) of the chosen δl can be a 
candidate value for the threshold parameters to indicate the endangered zone. Paths with 
an end-to-end failure probability more than the determined Pf (l)  should be rerouted prior 
to failure.    
The most endangered link in the disaster zone indicates with   (   ). This value may 
be obtained from a high rate of Pf (l) or bc(l) or both (equation 4). In this case, a high Pf (l) 
value is not a good candidate for the risk threshold parameter because a high threshold 
value forces the preventive rerouting scheme to leave more paths intact as they are below 
the protection threshold. The lack of inadequate protection to overlooked high-risk paths 
may lead to increase disrupted connections in the network. 
   (   ) made of a low failure probability indicates a link in the disaster zone with a 
good chance of surviving the disaster and connections using this link may remain  
undisrupted. Assigning low Pf (l) value of    (   ) as a threshold parameter may cause 
unnecessary preventive rerouting and impose extra unnecessary protection for paths with 
a high chance of surviving the damage.  
To adjust an appropriate rerouting threshold capable of protecting endangered paths 
with less extra overhead on the network, we employ the average failure probability 
adapted from the highest and lowest link damage risk rate in the disaster zone. To 
compute the risk threshold parameter in each interval decision, we consider the maximum 
and minimum calculated link damage risk rate and determine the associated failure 
probability. The average of the determined failure probabilities is employed by the 
proposed model to adjust the rerouting decision factor, PRT: 
( (max( )) (min( )))
f l f l
PRT Avg P P  
                                                        (11) 
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Changes in topology, resulting from failures due to the impact of the disaster, may 
alter betweenness centrality for the remaining links, which needs to be recomputed for the 
post-failure topology in each interval decision. The new betweenness value is used to 
update the PRT and keep the decision parameter adaptive with the network status. We 
show the procedure of calculating PRT in the following algorithm: 
 PRT adjustment algorithm 
 
BEGIN 
1: for all      
2:  ( )   Calculate failure probability 
3:  ( )  Calculate edge betweenness centrality 
4: ( )    ( )    ( ) 
5: end for 
6: while impact radius < max disaster zone 
7:            (     ( )) = failure probability of   max  ( )       
8:      (min    ( )  ) = failure probability of   min  ( ) 
9:          (   (     ( )) ,    (min   ( ))) 
10:        if impacted components= failed 
11:            remove failed links and nodes 
12:                         ( )            
13:                    ( )              
14:                                    
15:         end if 
16:  expand impact radius   
17: end while 
END 
 
The computed worst case time complexity for the self-adaptive protection algorithm in 
a network consists of |E| links and |V| nodes is O(|V
3
|) which is polynomial and  feasible. 
In the next section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed model and present our 
numerical results and analysis. 
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6.3 Performance evaluation 
We evaluate the efficiency of the proposed approach by conducting a simulation of 
various failure scenarios. The selected network topologies are the European Reference 
Network (ERnet) with 37 nodes, 57 links and a mean nodal degree of 3.08 and North-
American Reference Network (NARNet) with 39 nodes, 60 links and a mean nodal 
degree of 3.07, which are used in [79] to study dynamic survivable routing in a 
Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) network. The other applied simulation parameters 
are the same. 
 
Figure 29. Real-world network topologies: North-American Reference Network (NARNet) [79]. 
 

















































































Figures 29 and 30 show the network topologies employed to study self-adaptive 
protection. The topologies in our study are undirected graphs. The disaster is modeled in a 
circular shape with a radius that expands with time. We simulate the disaster duration for 
50 seconds. 
We model end-to-end unit demand for each pair of nodes to simulate traffic in the 
network. The possibility of a disaster can be located in any part of the network. To 
evaluate the efficiency of the proposed model, we simulate the disaster events in several 
random places in two real-world network topologies.  
Here the obtained results of two random locations of each network are illustrated with 
the information provided in Table 7.  
Table 7. Disaster geographical locations 
Network Geographical coordinates 
ERNET 
latitude = 47.9 N, longitude =5.3 E 
latitude = 48.4 N, longitude =9.6 E 
NARNET 
   latitude = 37.5N, longitude = 88.6W 
     latitude = 40.82N, longitude =80.9 W 
 
6.3.1 Performance results 
Figure 31 presents the results of adaptive protection for disaster events in these four 
locations. The studied parameter is the average number of disrupted connections, which is 
computed during the disaster scenario (50s). The results illustrate a comparison between 





































European Reference Network (ERNet)
Latitude = 47.9 N, Longitude = 5.3 E









































European Reference Network (ERNet)
Latitude = 48.4 N, Longitude=9.6 E









































North-American Reference Network (NARNet)
Latitude = 37.5 N, Longitude =88.67 W















Figure 31. Number of disrupted connections in large-scale failure scenarios. 
Figure 32 is a comparison between fixed thresholds protection (upper threshold 75%, 
lower threshold 50%) and the adaptive protection model. 
 































North-American Reference Network (NARNet)
Latitude = 40.8 N, Longitude =80.9 W











































European Reference Network (ERNet)
Latitude = 48.4 N, Longitude=9.6 E














Figure 32.  Network performance with fixed and adaptive threshold assignment. 
The assigned thresholds in the above performance study are chosen as examples and 































European Reference Network (ERNet)
Latitude = 47.9 N, Longitude = 5.3 E








































North-American Reference Network (NARNet)
Latitude = 37.5 N, Longitude=88.6 W









































North-American Reference Network (NARNet)
Latitude = 40.8 N, Longitude =80.9 W










can be changed to any other values for further examination. The selected parameter to 
investigate network performance for reactive and proactive protection approach is the 
average number of disrupted connections during the disaster event (50s). The results are 
provided for two random locations in the European reference network and two random 
locations in the North-American reference network. Each graph represents reactive 
protection with pre-assigned thresholds and a self-adaptive approach where thresholds 
change dynamically. Figure 33 demonstrates changes in PRT value in the adaptive 
protection approach while the disaster expands through the region.  
 
Figure 33. Threshold adjustment with disasters expansion. 
The studied parameters are the average PRT values in percentage, for each decision 
interval (each 10 second). Four random locations in two real-world topologies have been 
studied with this metric and results are obtained for disaster duration that is assumed to be 
about 50s.    
The results for preventive protection rerouting for the disaster locations in ERNet and 
NARNet networks are depicted in Figure 34. 















































Latitude = 47.9 N, Longitude= 5.3 E
Latitude = 48.4 N,  Longitude=9.6 E
Latitude = 37.5 N,  Longitude=88.6 W





Figure 34. Preventive protection rerouting. 
The metric in this study is the average number of preventive rerouting during the 
disaster scenario (50s). Selected random locations are the same as previous studies as we 
mentioned earlier.  




presented in Table 8. Here,  ̅is the sample mean value,   is the standard deviation and n 
is the sample size. The interval value less than 10
-6
 is shown as zero in the table. 
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North-American Reference Network (NARNet)












Latitude=37.5 N, Longitude =88.6 W
Latitude=40.8 N, Longitude =80.9 W
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Table 8. Obtained results with Confidence Level of 95.0%. 
Network 
Confidence Level(95.0%) in each inspection interval in second 
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6.3.2 Result analysis and discussion  
As can be seen in Figure 31, the number of disrupted connections in the adaptive 
protection model for all failure scenarios is reduced significantly compared to the reactive 
restoration approach. The fewer number of disrupted connections translates to more 
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reliability in the network. Because of the long distances among nodes and links in the 
North-American Reference Network topology compared to the European Reference 
Network, it may take time for the disaster to impact network components. During this 
gap, the impacted network may not experience a disruption in connections. 
We have provided a comparison for self-adaptive protection approach, where the 
threshold parameter can adjust itself based on network requirements and topology 
properties with a reactive protection model with pre-assigned threshold ranges (Figure 
32). The selected parameters in the fixed threshold approach are upper threshold (75%), 
lower threshold (50%). The results indicate that the adaptive protection model improves 
network efficiency by reducing the number of disrupted connections compared to the 
fixed thresholds approach. As the self-adaptive protection model is able to adjust itself 
with network conditions, the ultimate protection would be applied against failure 
scenarios. As can be seen, disruption in the network could be significantly reduced during 
disaster events in the self-adaptive protection approach.  
In Figure 33, the behaviour of PRT in different inspection intervals is depicted. PRT 
can adjust itself in combination with the network status in each decision interval time 
based on an updated network topology in each interval decision and by considering the 
disaster area to provide better protection. This can explain why PRT in each failure 
scenario follows a different pattern. The results indicate that if the network requires more 
protection and the self-adaptive approach determines that more paths are in danger and 
should be rerouted through more reliable paths, the threshold parameters change 
reactively to accomplish this requirement. On the other hand, the proposed protection 
approach is also able to increase the PRT value to reduce the number of required 
rerouting when it is determined that network protection can be enhanced with less 
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preventive rerouting.  The results for preventive protection rerouting for the disaster 
locations are depicted in Figure 33. Based on the rerouting decision parameter‟s value and 
topological properties in the disaster area, the number of preventive rerouting paths to 
improve network protection may be different. The results presented in Figure 34 are 
directly related to the assigned PRT value and also the number of failed paths that need 
traffic transferred through more reliable paths.  
6.4 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we improved the preventive protection model and made decision 
rerouting parameters adaptable with network conditions. We considered the strategic 
importance of the link in the network or link betweenness centrality and failure 
probability for endangered links to indicate the potential damage risk to each link 
involved in the impact area. Using the average failure probability of the maximum and 
minimum computed link damage risks, the proposed protection model calculated and 
assigned the rerouting decision parameters to reroute data prior to failure. As the disaster 
may change the network topology, the decision parameter has to be updated in each 






Chapter 7: Design preventive protection in SDN network 
Distinctive features in SDN provide flexibility for network developers to improve new 
experiments in a much more efficient way. In this chapter we design a protection model 
in SDN technology and explain the implementation steps in detail. We also study the 
required time to reroute the considerable number of data flows in SDN Openflow 
switches and examine the impact of a large topology on the controller when it needs to 
interact with extensive required data flow updates. 
7.1 SDN architecture overview 
Separating control plane and data plane in communication networks motivated 
network developers to introduce Software Defined Networking (SDN). Control plane 
handles the logic of traffic transmission such as data routing decisions or desired access 
policies. Data plane is involved in traffic forwarding based on the defined logic in the 
control plane.  Decoupling of these two important cores in an operational network can 
lead to enhance flexibility for network developers to experiment new ideas independent 
of the implemented hardware. Controlling the entire network from a central point, using 
developed software in tune with network requirements, may improve network 
performance efficiently and reduce debugging or reconfiguration efforts. 
Flow tables in switches and routers can be programmed using OpenFlow protocol. The 
defined configurations and desired policies in the controller are transferred to the 
OpenFlow switches through a secure channel [80]. Figure 35 shows the connection 
between controller and switches through OpenFlow protocol. Using OpenFlow protocol, 
OpenFlow controller instructs OpenFlow switches to update their flow table entries to 




Figure 35. OpenFlow interaction 
Along with developments in communication technology, providing a reliable 
connection is always important for service providers and subscribers. In this regard, 
network reliability is one of the main concerns for network designers and SDN 
developers. Network resiliency In SDN technology has been studied in several aspects 
such as improvement in fast notification to the controller or development in dynamic 
restoration or pre-planned protection mechanisms which have been discussed in chapter 2 
(literature review). 
In the literature, the main effort is to respond to failure events through a reactive 
approach and is mainly focused on single link failure scenarios. Here, our objective is to 
examine a proactive protection approach in SDN technology using pre-knowledge of 
potential failures that may affect a part of the network. The proposed model is not limited 
to a single failure problem and can improve network resiliency in large-scale failure 
scenarios such as natural disasters or power outages. Considering SDN technology and its 
features, our previous study of a preventive protection model is [60] fully appropriate and 
consistent with this concept. In the next section we explain our proposed model to 
mitigate disaster effects using SDN technology. We apply a preventive protection 
mechanism to SDN technology to design a new model that is able to address failure 







7.2 Disaster protection in SDN paradigm 
The available capabilities in SDN technology such as centralized controller, 
programmability and separation of data and control planes are the features that make this 
technology appropriate to develop a proactive protection mechanism in natural disaster 
scenarios. To improve network protection, the proposed model programs and manages 
data plane using OpenFlow protocol based on flow patterns in the controller. An 
application on top of the controller defines flow paths for each source and destination and 
decides how data should be routed in a disaster event. The controller inserts flow entries 
instructed by the disaster protection application and updates the routing table in each 
OpenFlow switches. Without SDN features, managing preventive rerouting and applying 
it proactively would be difficult or even infeasible in disaster scenarios. 
To improve network resiliency in case of natural disasters, the corresponding disaster 
protection application processes the received disaster‟s information and sends necessary 
protection decisions to the controller before a disaster can destroy the entire network.  We 
assume an earthquake-like model in our study, where the velocity propagation can be up 
to 8.5 km/s depending on geographical characteristics and earth materials [71]. This 
indicates that the disaster mitigation application and the SDN controller have a sufficient 
time to decide and apply desired protection policies, prior to damage of substantial parts 
of the communication infrastructure. 
The proposed protection model acts in a proactive way, which makes it distinctive 
from reactive protection mechanisms in failure scenarios. In a proactive protection 
mechanism, rerouting decisions are undertaken before a connection is disrupted. In 
contrast, reactive protection in current SDN technology responses to failures after fault 
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detection and during a time consuming process reroutes traffic through computed backup 
paths. Consequently, the delay between failure detection and traffic restoration results in 
packet loss. Although in preventive protection mechanism some expected reliable backup 
paths may fail as the applied method is probabilistic, the proposed model is able to save a 
significant number of connections against upcoming damage. 
7.2.1 Disaster mitigation application 
The disaster mitigation application is responsible for processing the received data 
regarding the disaster event. This information can be obtained by sensors designed to 
detect the occurrence or possible occurrence of natural disasters. The obtained 
information may include the area and severity of the disaster. Disaster detection or early 
warning and OpenFlow improvements to generate and send appropriate packets with 
disaster information are not considered in this thesis and need further research. In this 
chapter, we assume a disaster mitigation application is able to receive this information. 
The proposed application listens to the controller and, once a disaster event is detected, 
the application starts to process the received disaster data. Based on the provided 
information which is included structural conditions of the disaster area and its severity, 
the mitigation application computes the failure probability for each of the network 
components. According to the distance of the network components (node or link) to the 
epicentre, we may have different failure probabilities for each network component. This 
information will be used to calculate end-to-end path failure probability between each 
source and destination nodes. Considering this information, the proposed application is 
able to determine more reliable paths with less failure probability and send instructions 



















































































for selected OpenFlow switches with new paths and endangered traffic is rerouted 
through more reliable paths.  
 In Figure 36 we show the process of the preventive protection in SDN. Figure 36-a 
illustrates that a disaster sensor detects a possibility of a disaster and sends messages to 
the controller, which then triggers an event and notifies the preventive protection 
application. In Figure 36-b, the corresponding application processes the received data and 
computes reliable paths and sends the policy back to the controller. Afterward, the 
controller injects new paths and updates OpenFlow switches based on the indicated 
policy. Figure 36-c shows that while the disaster expands, the traffic of the endangered 
path is rerouted through more reliable paths determined by the preventive protection 
application.  At a moment of the endangered link failure  (Figure 36-d), its traffic has 
been already moved through new paths and the endangered traffic is therefore protected 
against failure. By expanding the disaster, if any link or node is damaged, the preventive 
mitigation application is notified and the traffic of the lost link is rerouted through a 
reliable path. The contributions of the proposed approach in a natural disaster conditions 
are: 
 Proactive protection approach reroutes traffic of the endangered path prior to 
failure. In this way, the amount of lost information will be reduced. In contrast, 
current reactive restoration mechanisms in SDN restore traffic once the controller 
has been informed and backup paths are determined along with updating routing 
tables in OpenFlow switches. This process comes with delay which may cause 
packet loss.   
 In the reactive restoration approach, backup paths are calculated by the controller, 
usually using shortest path algorithm. Since the controller has no knowledge of the 
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disaster spreading, the assigned backup path may also be damaged by the disaster 
expansion. In the proactive protection model, traffic is rerouted through more 
reliable paths with a lower failure probability thus giving them a chance of survival, 
even with disaster expansion.  
 The proactive protection model is able to improve network resiliency in multi-
failure events as it follows a probabilistic pattern and the provided protection is 
based on the available network infrastructure (post-failure topology). This feature 
perceives the proposed preventive model from a predefined backup path protection 
method. There is a possibility that in the predefined protection approach, working 
and backup paths are both damaged with disaster expansion. On the other hand, pre-
determining a backup path for a failure situation of a probabilistic nature is very 
hard or infeasible. 
7.2.2 Performance study  
We evaluate the efficiency of SDN controller by study failures in European Reference 
Network (ERnet) with 37 nodes and 57 links and a mean nodal degree of 3.08. Each city 
in the topology represents a node in our study, which is considered as an OpenFlow 
switch. We simulate the disaster duration for 50 seconds for a random place, around the 
east of France (longitude = 47.9 N, latitude=5.3 E). To study the performance of 
protection in SDN network, we consider an off-line running of the preventive model and 
instruct the controller using the obtained results. Table 9 shows the required preventive 










10s 20s 30s 40s 
Number of 
rerouted paths 
141 3 14 11 79 
 
The details of the implementation for the experimental test-bed are provided in 
Appendix section. Figure 37 shows an overview of SDN test-bed implementation.  
 
Figure 37. SDN Controller and OpenFlow vSwitches 
At the time that a disaster is detected or the possibility of a disaster is predicted, an 
extensive amount of rerouting is required until the end of the disaster event. In this case, 
the controller should update a considerable number of paths. As the common way to 
interact between API and the controller is through http connection, we examine different 
ways to instruct the controller. To evaluate performance, the required time to add data 
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Figure 38. Controller response time in different interaction ways 
 
Figure 38 shows the required time to update the OpenFlow switches flow table using 
different approaches. In the first approach, single thread single socket, each required 
update is sent to the controller sequentially. A considerable number of requested data 
flow updates in the first interval are processed through a time consuming process. By 
decreasing the number of data flow updates, we can see that the consumed time to update 
OpenFlow virtual switches flow tables decreases. To improve the controller response time 
and accelerate the process, we implemented the request in the form of single thread multi 
socket. The results are the same as the previous approach and indicate that the controller 
only listens to one port for web connections and the process of applying data flow updates 
is the same as the single thread and single socket approach. By using multi thread to 
instruct the controller to apply data flow updates, we can see that the response time 
decreases considerably (i.e., almost half of the previous approaches). Using a multi thread 
and multi socket approach shows the same results as explained earlier as the OpenFlow 
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Figure 39. OVS direct interaction. 
To reduce the required time to add new paths, we extend our experience to install 
flows directly to the OpenFlow switches. This extension can be improved as embedded 
part in the OpenFlow controller as a separate module, specified for disaster recovery. 
The results presented in Figure 39 shows that direct interaction with OpenFlow 
switches can improve the required time considerably. This improvement can be 
considered for further OpenFlow protocol development to instruct OpenFlow virtual 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and future works 
Network survivability as an important factor to provide reliable communication in 
large-scale failure scenarios was the main focus of this research. Through this thesis, we 
provided an extensive study of network survivability in large-scale failure scenarios in 
both deterministic and probabilistic approaches. We developed an approach considering 
destructive wave energy behaviour in a time-varying, large-scale failure scenario to 
compute probability of failures for network components in disaster area. We extended the 
time-varying probabilistic model and introduced a novel preventive protection approach 
to enhance network resiliency in large-scale failure scenarios. The developed scheme 
applied end-to-end path failure probabilities and used switching parameters, called upper 
and lower thresholds, to reroute endangered traffic through more reliable paths. The 
results indicate that the proposed model was able to decrease the average network 
disruption time as well as the average number of disrupted connections. Both improved 
parameters are important to enhance the level of resilience and ensure undisrupted data 
delivery in the network. We provided a method to refine the parameters of a preventive 
protection scheme in a dynamic and proactive manner with the goal of reducing the 
number of disrupted connections in large-scale scenarios. We showed why adjusting 
threshold parameters have an important effect to protect data flows prior to failure and 
studied the influence of them on network performance. We proposed an algorithm to 
analyze network performance in different threshold ranges and discussed how parameter 
value assignments can affect network performance and the provided protection level.  To 
improve the preventive protection model and make decision rerouting parameters 
adaptable with network conditions, we considered the strategic importance of the link in 
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the network or link betweenness centrality in addition to failure probability for 
endangered links. These two parameters employed to indicate the potential damage risk to 
each link involved in the impact area. Using the average failure probability of the 
maximum and minimum computed link damage risks, the proposed protection model 
calculated and assigned the rerouting decision parameters in an automated way. As the 
disaster may change the network topology, the proposed approach was to be able to 
update decision parameters in each interval inspection according to network conditions. 
Considering software defined networking as an emerging technology, we designed an 
approach to improve network protection in large-scale failure scenarios in SDN network. 
The performance of the SDN controller to apply an extensive number of data flow 
updates through different http interaction ways was studied. 
At this point, our proposed model can successfully increase the required level of 
network resiliency and apply protection in large-scale failure scenarios. The proposed 
model can be improved considering several aspects for further studies.  
Future research in large-scale failure scenarios includes developing an optimization 
model to reduce the number of preventive rerouting paths while providing the maximum 
network resiliency. By optimizing the decision parameters, network resiliency in large-
scale failure scenarios can be improved while decreasing the added overhead on the 
network caused by extra required preventive rerouting.  
Although the preventive protection model is distinct from the failure probability 
estimation process and capable of improving network protection as long as the failure 
probability of network components are provided, an enhanced process to determine 
failure probability for each specific disaster scenario such as earthquakes, hurricanes, etc., 
can  be considered as a significant improvement in future studies. This improvement can 
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be considered as a collaborative effort between IT developers and experts in the study of 
the disruptive behaviour of natural disasters to estimate the possible failure probability for 
network components with enhanced accuracy.  
Taking into account the SDN technology, develop a disaster mitigation application 
specified to address failures in large-scale disaster scenarios can be an important 
development in future. Embedding the preventive protection model in OpenFlow protocol 
to reduce external application interaction with the controller can be a solution to provide 
carrier-grade network reliability.  
Security features also can be considered as a further development in different parts of 
the proposed preventive model such as receiving secure messages regarding the disaster 
information and securely applying threshold parameters. 
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Experimental test-bed and implementation details 
 
We discuss several ways to deploy interaction between API and the controller as 
following: 
a) Single thread, single socket 
The first approach is to add the requested flows through REST API and sends requests 
one at a time. In this situation, we have same socket (IP address + port) for all requests. 
For the experimental model in this study we use a web access to the controller.  
b) Single thread, multiple sockets 
The selected controller in this experiment (OpenDaylight) does not allow us to use 
different ports to establish http connections.  To create multiple sockets one solution is to 
use same port with different IP addresses. To have several IP addresses in the controller, 
we are allowed to increase the number of ethernet cards in the virtual machine (VM) up to 
10. Since one of these connections will be dedicated to the Internet for any required 
update, the rest can be used for adding several IP addresses and create load balancing in 
the controller.  For this purpose, we assign different IP address to each ethernet card. By 
running the API, at each time one IP address will be selected and the request will be sent 
to the controller.  
c) Multiple Threads, Single Socket 
Rather than running each request sequentially, the other solution is create new thread 
for each HTTP request and let that request run in its own thread until it has completed.  
d) Multiple Threads, Multiple Socket 
This solution is a combination of the previous scenarios, trying a mix of multi-
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threading and multiple sockets. 
To simulate the disaster event we implemented this model in virtual test-bed which we 
explain in following.  
Experimental evaluation has been implemented on a Dell CS24-T4 server with 32GB 
memory, 12 Intel Xeon CPUs with 2.133 GHZ frequency on 925 GB hard drive capacity. 
The test-bed is implemented in virtual platform.  Hypervisor in the platform is VMware 
ESX-i. To distribute the physical server and create more virtual machines with load 
balancing among them, we added another ESX-i server to the cluster in the VMware 
vCenter.  Each virtual machine has been configured with CentOS 6.5 and OpenVSwitch  
(OVS)  2.1.2. acts as a node of the chosen topology. 
 Each OVS VM has 2GB memory with 11 GB allocated hard disk.  To be able to test 
ping between source and destination, each OVS VM needs to have a host connected to it. 
In order to configure a host for each OVS VM, we created another VM and assigned a 
bridge port (i.e., br10) of OVS to have connection to the host. Tiny Core Linux is the best 
option to have a light operation system in this extra layer of virtualization. Tiny Core 
Linux operating system can run well on only 17 MB hard space and 128 MB RAM. In 
our experimental test-bed, we configure Tiny Core Linux OS on top of the CentOS using 
VirtualBox with 128 MB memory and 256 MB disk space. This extra configuration adds 
another layer of virtualization and complexity to the system. The controller in the 
experimental model is configured with OpenDaylight software running on one of the 
CentOS VMs. The selected IP address scheme for this experiment is 10.10.0.0/16. Table 






Table10. IP addresses scheme in experimental test bed. 











“X” refers to the switch number 
Hosts 10.10.X.10 
 
“X” refers to the switch number 
Physical server 10.10.0.1  
Desktop PC 10.10.0.2  
 
As the OVS is a software switch, it should be installed on top of the existing system. It 
also should be able to tie to physical port using bridge. The bridge acts as a middle 
interface between the OVS software and the physical ethernet port. For example in each 
OVS we create a bridge called br0 and attached its port to the physical ethernet port. The 
associated IP address will be assigned to br0 and not to the ethernet port. To make 
possible that two OVSs interact to each other and keep configuration persistence, we need 
an overlay link between them such as generic routing encapsulation (GRE) tunnel. The 
GRE tunnel will be configured in another bridge (i.e., br0) and makes up link between 
two switches. 
By adding IP addresses to the OVSs and configure GRE tunnels among them, upon 
loading OpenDaylight, the graphical interface of the controller shows the nodes and links 
via a http connection. 
By looking at the topology, we can see some adjacent nodes are located far away from 
each other.  In this case, sending a packet from a source to the destination with 
considerable distance will cause propagation delay. To apply this delay, we have 
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calculated the actual distance between adjacent nodes (cities) in ERnet topology using 
google map distance tool with an acceptable approximation.  
To simulate propagation delay for each link we use traffic control (TC) module in 
Linux, however this module is not awareness of software bridges (i.e., br0, br1, etc.) 
employed by OVSs. TC properties should be applied to the physical port (i.e., eth0) 
directly. The problem with this is that if we configure our entire overlay GRE tunnels that 
connect to various switches on top of this port, then any delay configuration on the 
physical port will be applied to all GRE tunnels, resulting in each tunnel having the same 
delay value which is in contrast with our goal.    
To address this issue, TC should be applied directly to each physical port. In Linux 
VM we are able to extend ethernet ports to maximum 10, means that we can connect each 
OVS to maximum 10 other switches. Here we recall that, based on the selected topology, 
maximum OVS connections are 6 and this feature can fulfill our requirements by adding 
extra physical ports to each Linux VM. For each added physical port, we create an 
individual bridge and then configure tunnels among switches with different source and 
destination IP addresses. In this way, we are able to apply delay to each physical port and 
simulate propagation delay. 
 
